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Taft-Hartley--Separation of Function in N. L. R. B.
On June 23, 1947, the Senate enacted the Taft-Hartley Act 1 into law
over the vigorous veto of President Truman who objected to the Act on the
ground, inter alia, that it was "unworkable." 2 One of the many features
of the new act which has been the subject of much controversy was the
change it worked in the organization and procedure of the National Labor
Relations Board, the administrative machine charged with enforcing the
national labor policy in this field. The principal organizational theme of
the Act in relation to the N. L. R. B. was its so-called "separation of func-
tion," i.e., the separation of prosecuting and investigating unfair labor prac-
tice charges from their adjudication, the former functions being assigned
to an independent prosecutor's office while the latter was retained by a
National Labor Relations Board, enlarged from three to five members.3
The recent resignation of General Counsel Robert Denham at the "re-
quest" of President Truman 4 highlights the bitter disputes which have been
raging for several years over the feasibility of such a functional separation
and focuses our attention to a reexamination of the scheme involved here.
It is the purpose of this Note to explore its advantages and disadvantages
in the light of its three years in actual operation, and to suggest possible
legislative changes. First, however, a brief review of the prevailing condi-
tions under Taft-Hartley's predecessor is in order.
TWELVE YEARS UNDER THE WAGNER AcT
The Wagner Act marked the entrance of our federal government into
a highly complex field of social and economic relations with little previous
experience or understanding of the innumerable problems to be encountered.
The mandate of this Act was broad and general-to implement collective
bargaining and work out techniques and methods of preserving labor's
rights to freedom of industrial association. It is suggested that this monu-
mental task could only have been successfully undertaken by an administra-
tive agency with the highest degree of flexibility to explore, investigate,
analyze and fashion the most applicable remedies to the many novel un-
folding situations.
In its hvelve year operation under the mandate of the Wagner Act,5
The Board had been committed to no single, rigid system of organization
1. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr OF 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.
N 141-197 (Supp. 1947).
2. See the text of the veto message in 93 Cong. Rec. 7485 (1947).
3. LMRA § 3 (a).
4. N.Y. Times, Sep. 16, 1950, p. 1, col. 2.
5. 49 STAT. 449, (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940).
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throughout its various branches. It had, in fact, undertaken several in-
ternal reorganizations and revised its rules of practice and procedure.
6
Gradually, its internal organization became stabilized and for several years
prior to the enactment of Taft-Hartley there was an internal separation of
function whereby within its regional offices the personnel engaged in in-
vestigating and prosecuting were generally separated from those conducting
elections and performing other work.7 Hearing officers were assigned from
Washington and upon conclusion of hearings, records were transferred to
the Washington office for a sort of appellate procedure where arguments
to the Trial Examiner's preliminary findings were received. At this Wash-
ington level, the record might be examined by the Review Section,
[abolished in Taft-Hartley, § 4(a)] which advised the Board and drafted
summaries of the pertinent sections of the record. As to the initiation of
action by the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints, the Regional
Directors possessed a substantial amount of autonomy, but they reported
regularly on these affairs to the Secretary in Washington who in turn kept
the Board informed. This provided the Board with a desirable flexibility
in that it could advise with regional officers regarding new situations and
it was also in a position to manage the calendar of cases coming before
them so as to best work out the policies to be announced. The ability to
pick the order of cases to be decided was regarded as an important instru-
ment of uniform policy-making.8  The practices of the Board followed
meticulously the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 9 which
will be discussed later.
The above practices were very similar to those adopted by the bulk of
administrative agencies under federal sponsorship. Experience had ap-
parently proven this pattern to be efficient and manageable from the agencies
points of view.
However, twelve years of vigorous N. L. R. B. activity under the
Wagner Act impressed many of the Taft-Hartley sponsors with the con-
viction that this agency was adjudicating with an unduly partisan (pro-
labor) attitude.10 Moreover, the agency had not won wholehearted public
approval of its activity."
The prevalence of this attitude by Congress and large segments of the
public was probably the inevitable consequence of the Board's creation to
administer an Act establishing new rights for labor and no affirmative
rights for its adversary. Inasmuch as only employers could be "prosecuted"
6. See MLLTS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr To TAFT HARTLEY, chap.
2 (1950).
7. See Hearings Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and
S.$. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1898 (1947).
8. Op. cit. supra note 6 at 39, 43.
9. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
10. See HARTLEY, OUR NEW NATIONAL LABOR PoLicy 141, 142 (1948) ; N.L.R.B.,
LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT OF 1947, 296, 297,
316, 613, 883 (1948).
11. Note the testimony of former Board member Gerard Reilly in Hearings
Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and SJ. Res. 22, 80&h
Cong., 1st Sess., 2045 (1947).
under the Act, it seems only natural that agency personnel should have
worked very closely with the representatives of organized labor. More-
over, the general reluctance of management to accept the Wagner Act with-
out a fight undoubtedly served to engender a certain esprit de corps among
the personnel and members of the Board.1 2 Thus, it is not surprising that
many Congressmen who were genuinely alarmed at the growing power of
large labor organizations acted to effect a change in the economic and
political attitude of the agency. To effectuate this desire, the procedural
scheme of the N. L. R. B. under the Wagner Act had to be revised to ac-
commodate the new policies mirrored by Taft-Hartley.
FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY
This Act, unlike the Wagner Act, comprehends no vigorous program
to implement the rights of a single economic group; it envisions rather
the striking of a delicate balance weighing evenly the interests of the two
competing groups. Many Congressmen believed that a judicial attitude
was infinitely more desirable than the often singular purpose outlook of
the former agency. Therefore, the original House Bill contemplated the
complete dissolution of the N. L. R. B. and establishment of a new labor
court with all the administrative functions of investigating, prosecuting, and
conducting elections vested in a single administrator.13 This proposal was
modified to the present system by the Conference Committee which may
have felt that modification was necessary in order to win support against
an almost certain veto.
The basic provisions of the final compromise are to be found in § 3(d)
which transfers from the Board to a General Counsel final authority re-
specting the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practice charges
under § 8 and supervisory power over attorneys and other personnel in
the Regional Offices. On the other hand, the Board retained power to
conduct certification proceedings (representation elections), and to appoint
attorneys, Trial Examiners, and "such other employees as it may from
time to time find necessary." In addition, the Board was to serve strictly
as the adjudicating branch in unfair labor practice cases and was to con-
duct the so-called "union-shop" elections under § 8(a) (3). Congressman
Hartley, author of the original proposal was quick to venture his opinion
that the compromise effectively retained all the significant features of his
plan.14 However, with representation proceedings conducted under the
exclusive direction of the Board, it is doubtful if Mr. Hartley's statement
is really accurate.
FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION . . . AN EVALUATION
The Advantages.-Traditionally the enforcement activities of adminis-
trative agencies are instituted on the agency's own motion upon receipt
12. Ibid.
13. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
14. HART-EY, OuR Nzw NATIONAL LABOR PoLIcY 79 (1948).
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of a complaint from parties feeling aggrieved by some invasion of their
rights. This was the usual pattern under the old N. L. R. B. The agency,
however, was deemed to be in complete charge of its own proceedings and
might refuse to take action at all if it thought this best in the particular
case. In most cases, its refusal to act was not deemed judicially review-
able, perhaps because it had promulgated no order running against anyone
with standing to appeal. 15 Thus, by refusing to institute any action for
enforcing the law, an administrative agency might be in a position to render
a specific law practically ineffective. The hazard of permitting an agency
to deny relief by inaction is particularly strong where the agency may be
wholly unsympathetic with the basic policies of the statute it alone can
enforce.
One arrangement to mitigate against the danger of administrative in-
action would be to permit the parties to initiate their own actions in the
courts as Taft-Hartley does in the case of contract breaches and secondary
boycotts.' 6 This, however, is extremely undesirable in the labor-manage-
ment field for overburdened courts are unable to deal expeditiously with
the delicate economic problems that must be handled rapidly and efficiently
if the disastrous effects of industrial strife are to be avoided. Moreover,
there is a need in this field for the expertness and specialized experience
which only exists in a body of experts who can at once assess and weigh
the interests of public, employer and worker. Therefore, the separation of
function envisaged by Taft-Hartley may be seen as an attempt to combine
the expertness and speedy action of the administrative agency with the
vigorous enforcement characteristic of the independent public prosecutor.
Under Taft-Hartley, administrative inaction is still clearly possible,
for the General Counsel may in his absolute discretion refuse to prosecute
a given complaint. The difference between enforcement by an independent
prosecutor and a combined function agency is that under the former ar-
rangement responsibility for prosecution is isolated in a single, independent
office where inaction may be more easily detected and treated. Further,
a prosecutor can build a reputation only through the vigor and efficiency of
his enforcement program, whereas, in the fused-function agency, prosecu-
tion may be subordinated to other activities through many influences that
would not act on one whose sole job is prosecution. A particular hazard
of the old scheme was that a regional officer might reasonably hesitate to
initiate action which he did not feel assured would meet favorably with the
Board members to whom he was responsible. The penalty for too much
independence in this case would be loss of employment, assignment to un-
desirable work or forfeiture of opportunities for promotion. This danger
is not so strong where he is responsible to an independent prosecutor.
15. Jacobsen v. N.L.R.B., 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941); See generally Note,
Statutory Standing to Review Administrative Action, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 70 (1949).
See also Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
(1940).
16. LMRA §§ 301, 303.
It has been suggested that one of the major vices of most administrative
agencies is their tendency to become eventually over-identified with the
group regulated, particularly after dealing with the group for a period of
many years.17 Contacts formed may tend to convince the agency personnel
that the regulated group is not such a bad lot after all, and friendships
acquired with members of the group may tend to destroy much of the zeal
and fire with which the agency once began its task. Here too, the existence
of an alert and independent prosecutor, whose success depends on the scope
and success of the prosecutions he undertakes, may mitigate against the
hazard of administrative inaction. For somewhat similar reasons, private
persons are occasionally permitted to initiate criminal actions in cases in-
volving gambling, liquor violations, prostitution and other activities inimical
to the public interest when there is great temptation for inaction by the
public force.' 8
The Disadvantages-The business of the National Labor Relations
Board falls roughly into two classes: it supervises the representation pro-
ceeding which establishes a bargaining unit and certified representative and
also ultimately decides the unfair labor practice charges which are in-
vestigated and prosecuted by the General Counsel. In the latter case, com-
pliance with the Board's determination may have to be enforced by the
courts where the General Counsel is necessarily the Board's agent in defend-
ing the ruling. The failure of the Act to define and interrelate more clearly
the duties of each branch has been responsible for some measure of con-
fusion and regrettable dispute between the Board and the General Counsel.
They have failed to see eye to eye in defining their respective roles under
the separation of function. For example, one provision of the new Act
provides that in the event of a strike only those workers then employed plus
those entitled to re-instatement shall be eligible to vote in any representation
election currently conducted.' 9 Thus, unfair labor practice strikers are
entitled to vote while "economic" strikers who have been permanently
replaced are not entitled to vote. In a recent case,20 the General Counsel
dismissed unfair labor practice charges asserted by strikers. They were,
therefore, categorized as "economic" strikers and denied the right to vote
in an ensuing election. The Board somewhat reluctantly felt itself bound
by the General Counsel's determination, and therefore, it could not make
an independent investigation to determine the status of the strikers.
A more serious problem might arise where strikers have asserted
charges of company domination against a rival union only to have them dis-
missed by the General Counsel for lack of evidence or other factors. In
determining whether to accord the accused union a place on the ballot, the
Board might very well feel that its responsibility for a fair election entitled
17. See Davis, Administrative Powers, 63 HARV. L. REv. 192, 221-222 (1949).
18. See Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IoWA
L. REv. 485, 505-506 (1940).
19. LMRA §9(c)(3).
20. Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361 (1948).
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it to hold hearings of its own and inquire into this issue. Such action might
easily be justified on the ground that the usual remedy for company domina-
tion in an unfair labor practice case (i.e., an order of disestablishment) need
not be issued here and that the only effect of a Board decision on this issue
would be to exclude the union from the ballot in certification proceedings.
As for the practical effect on the accused union, the distinction would prove
extremely tenuous. Apparently this problem has not yet arisen but remains
as an embarrassing possibility.
In any event, a General Counsel angered by any such Board decision
is in a position to stymie it if the employer refuses to bargain with the
certified union. This is due to the fact that the only effective way in which
the Board's certification can be enforced is through the charge of refusing
to bargain with the certified union.21 This charge is one of unfair labor
practice where the General Counsel's discretion to dismiss is final.22 Thus,
the prosecutor is in a position to nullify almost any action the Board might
take in a certification proceeding.
Still another situation in which the present system may be weak is
where an employer and a labor union each seek to file charges accusing the
other of an unfair labor practice with regard to the same occurrence or
event. Inasmuch as the General Counsel represents the complainant in
these proceedings, he might face a difficult choice in deciding which party
he will serve as advocate, although presumably he could also prosecute both
parties in the same hearing.
In addition to the friction occasioned by the disagreements between
the Board and the General Counsel as to their respective functions, serious
differences of fundamental policy have arisen. The dispute between General
Counsel Denham and the Board members on the question of jurisdiction,
once a lively source of friction,2 seems to have been finally settled with the
Board's decision that it will dismiss any complaint in cases involving less
than a minimum amount of interstate commerce. 24  The Board's position
was that the "policies of the act" would best be promoted by refusing to
entertain jurisdiction in cases where the interstate commerce is "insub-
stantial." They may well have had a weather eye to the serious backlog
of cases awaiting their determination, but Mr. Denham (then General
Counsel) had vigorously contended that once he had entertained a com-
plaint, the Board could not dismiss on policy grounds if technical juris-
diction did in fact exist. The Board overruled this contention in Smith,
d. b. a. A-1 Photo Service,25 and the new General Counsel has apparently
accepted this determination as binding on him.26 While the opinion of the
Board is entitled to much weight in these matters, it seems difficult to find
21. Cf., Baltimore Transit Co., 59 N.L.R.B., 159 (1944).
22. LMRA §3(d).
23. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 18, col. 6.
24. Ibid.
25. 83 N.L.R.B. 564 (1949).
26. N.Y. Times, supra note 23.
in the legislative history of Taft-Hartley any ground for the decision. In-
deed, the backers of Taft-Hartley may have felt that the "little fellow" was
the one who might well most need the protection of the Act.
2
T
Another possible area of disagreement arose in the Board's decision
that only local unions asserting charges or seeking certification need comply
with the Taft-Hartley requirements concerning non-Communist affidavits .2
The General Counsel had vigorously argued that the locals were not entitled
to use the machinery of the N. L. R. B. unless their international officers
had also filed the affidavits. Had the General Counsel chosen not to honor
the Board decision here, we might have seen the locals being certified by
the Board but unable to force an employer to bargain with them because
the General Counsel had decided they were not entitled to the benefits of
the Act.
29
In another case, both the Board and the General Counsel had sought
an injunction in the courts against a union which challenged the action on
the ground that the Board could not delegate to the General Counsel the
function of seeking preliminary injunctions. Mr. Denham took the position
that he had this power irrespective of any delegation by the Board. The
Board, however, wanted him to argue that it had the power but could
delegate it. Only after the Board threatened to file a separate brief was it
able to persuade Mr. Denham to present both arguments in the alternative
without revealing the disagreement. The court accepted the Board inter-
pretation.80 The case highlights the possible weakness in forcing the Board
to rely on a disagreeing General Counsel to defend its rulings in the courts.
It may be said that this is no worse than the situation wherein a district
attorney may be forced to defend a court's ruling on a different theory than
that which he favors. The analogy is far from perfect, however. A district
attorney's success or failure in the handling of an appeal will seldom have
the far reaching economic effect that will often arise in a labor-management
case. Because the Board felt that the effect of its decision on national labor
policy was extremely important, it recently filed a separate brief asking the
court to ignore the arguments of the General Counsel's brief.31 Perhaps,
the Board should be permitted to appoint a solicitor to represent it on
appeal.
In mitigation of these several hazards it may be pointed out that the
power of presidential removal operates as a powerful lever in securing the
necessary cooperation between both branches of the agency. President
Truman's action in "forcing" the resignation of General Counsel Denham
is a case directly in point. It -also shows, however, the possibilities available
to a President openly hostile to the Taft-Hartley Act. Some suggestion
27. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended the benefits of the act only
for the corporate giant.
28. Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N.L.R.B., 11 (1947).
29. The courts apparently will have a chance to interpret the provisions of the
act relating to the Communist affidavits. See West Texas Utilities Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
184 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
30. See Evans v. Int'l. Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 881 (D.C. Ind. 1948).
31. See N.Y. Times, Sep. 16, 1950, p. 10, col. 2.
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has been made that the Act gives the President no power to remove the
General Counsel,32 in view of the Congressional emphasis on an independent
prosecutor and the fact that Taft-Hartley expressly provides for removal
of Board members 3- but remains silent as to the General Counsel.
Evaluation.--That these differences in opinion between General
Counsel and Board have resulted in some inconvenience and uncertainty is
undeniable. But initial differences of scope and interpretation are to be
expected under bifurcation just as one might expect differences in opinion
between district attorney and judge or between the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue and Tax Court. They detract from perfectly uniform ad-
ministration but the occasional friction developed does serve to insure that
all issues are brought into the open for examination and consideration by
the public as well as the courts and Congress. In fact, one defect of the
standard administrative agency may well be that not all these differences
reach the attention of the public and Congress so that corrections can be
made.
Contrary to general expectations, this separation of function has not
resulted in any seriously increased cost of agency operation. The old
N. L. R. B. had already achieved a large measure of internal separation
with officers engaging in prosecution very rarely involved in other work.34
The new arrangement may be viewed more as a division of power rather
than a doubling of personnel. The Regional offices continue to handle most
of the work involved in both unfair labor practice and representation pro-
ceedings. Trial Examiners are still sent from Washington and the record
continues to go to the Board in Washington for consideration and decision.
The extreme functional separation envisaged by Taft-Hartley may be
justly criticized if it results in any appreciable failure to encourage the
speedy, informal settlement of these delicate disputes between large unions
and large employers. The ability of the standard administrative agency to
negotiate these informal settlements has been aptly described as the very life
blood of the administrative process. 5 The old Board had pointed with
considerable pride to its record in this department.36 Opponents of bifurca-
tion point with alarm to the relatively low percentage of informal settle-
ments in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin where separation has been adopted
in the state labor machinery.37 This was the principal objection which the
Attorney General's Committee raised to any functional division.3 8 Though
it may be true that a prosecutor might be less inclined to encourage private
agreement than the usual administrator, three years of operation under
Taft-Hartley have seen no serious increase in the proportion of cases pro-
32. Ibid.
33. LMRA § 3(a).
34. Supra note 7.
35. See REP. OF ATn'y. GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. 58, 59 (1941).
36. See Hearings, supra note 7 at 1928.
37. Ibid.
38. Op. cit. mtpra note 35 at 58.
ceeding to formal litigation, except in the area of the new substantive provi-
sions. It seems only natural to expect more litigation while the law is
being initially explored and tested than one would expect at a later stage.
As a matter of fact, this seems to have been the case with the old N. L. R. B.,
whose record in this respect shows a marked increase in private settlements
during later years of its operation. The problem here seems largely one of
good statesmanship and an enlightened prosecutor might just as well be
inclined to avoid unnecessary litigation as would be an agency which is both
prosecutor and judge.3 9 Moreover, the existence of a vigorous prosecutor
might conceivably serve to deter many violations where the uncertainty of
standard administrative action might not. Significantly, the bulk of agency
work is still processed through the regional level where the staffs are
highly experienced in the technique of negotiating these important informal
and speedy private settlements.
Apparently no data has been published showing the average speed
with which cases are disposed of under the new system when they proceed
to formal hearing and decision. The Hoover committee, however, did
report that the office of the General Counsel has handled its work very
smoothly while a considerable backlog of cases has piled up on the Board.40
This is somewhat inconclusive since the lag in the Board's work is probably
caused by its additional responsibility of conducting union shop elections
under Taft-Hartley.
41
It is at once obvious that separation of function is feasible only in a
limited number of agencies, i.e., in those whose operations involve primarily
the prosecution of charges on which a clear cut adjudication can be made.
In the unfair labor practice charge we see the most ideal setting for this
scheme of organization. The advantages of more vigorous prosecution and
centralized responsibility flowing from the functional separation are par-
tially offset by the necessity for enforcing certification orders through the
medium of an unfair labor practice charge (refusal to bargain). This pro-
vides the General Counsel with an avenue either to nullify or greatly
hamper the Board's action. Therefore, an examination of possible legis-
lative correction is desirable.
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The suggestion has been made that interlocutory judicial review of
representation proceedings would be desirable.42 Under such a procedure,
the issues at stake in a representation proceeding could be effectively settled
and would become res judicata before the General Counsel is called upon to
enforce the decision in a complaint charging the parties with a refusal to
bargain with the certified representatives. This alternative is undesirable,
39. See BENJAMIN, ADMINIsTRATIVE ADJUDIcATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 52 (1942).
40. As reported in 11 N.A.M. LAW DIGEST 53 (1949).
41. As provided in LMRA § 8(a) (3).
42. Hearings, mipra note 7 at 1930.
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however, in that it would almost invariably serve as a weapon of delay
and seriously increase the workload of the agency staff. It would require
the Board to supervise a separate staff of -attorneys specializing in these
appeals. The present backlog of cases awaiting the Board's time and con-
sideration is already serious and increased pressure would possibly prove
disastrous."
At the time Taft-Hartley was being considered by Congress the argu-
ment was advanced by many that the newly passed Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 44 would serve to protect the parties against the alleged bias
of the N. L. R. B. 45 and therefore the whole scheme of functional separation
was unnecessary. No exhaustive analysis of this Act is contemplated here,
but it is desirable to note the difference in emphasis between the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) and Taft-Hartley.
The APA grew out of the recommendations of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure. The majority of this committee
had expresslly rejected the idea of functional separation for prosecuting
agencies.4 6 The minority of the committee, nevertheless, had approved it
for a limited number of agencies.
47
Section 5 (c) of the APA meets the separation of function problem with
the requirement that:
.. . No officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance
of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case
shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the
decision, recommended decision or agency review . . . except as
a witness or counsel in public proceedings. .. ."
It will be noted that the emphasis of this Act is on separation of function
at and during the hearing and decision levels. The whole tenor of the Act
is to secure a fair hearing for those affected by agency action, while the Taft-
Hartley functional separation is directed toward seeing that action is in-
stituted in the first instance. Obviously if the agency officers file no com-
plaint or institute no action which will call for a hearing, the Administrative
Procedure Act will not aptly at all. Since this method is the precise
manner in which an agency unsympathetic to a given statute can render it
ineffective, the Taft-Hartley emphasis on the initiation of action by an
independent prosecutor may be seen as complementary to the APA rather
than in conflict with it.
Another proposed remedy seems more designed to meet the defects
of the present duality in agency function. This is the suggestion that since
the most bitterly assailed feature of Taft-Hartley bifurcation lies in the
43. Supra note 40.
44. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
45. See Hearings, supra note 7 at 1050.
46. REP. Avr'y. GEN. CoMm. AD. PRoc. 55-60 (1941).
47. Id. at 208.
General Counsel's unlimited discretion to dismiss complaints, he should *be
required in such cases to file a written opinion. This would have a salu-
tary effect in that it would (1) caution the General Counsel against purely
arbitrary action, (2) require him to give a reason for his dismissal, and (3)
would inform the parties and the public when the dismissal is based on his
disagreement with a Board decision in certification proceedings. A fourth
advantage stemming from such a requirement would be that a body of
precedent would be established on which future legislative changes could
be predicated.
It should be noted that the number of instances where the General
Counsel has dismissed a complaint are extremely few and presumably arise
largely from a lack of evidence on which to pursue the charges rather than
a desire to stymie Board decisions with which he is in disagreement. In
any event the requirement of a written statement explaining the dismissal
would indicate clearly the basis of such action and might possibly open
the way to the use of mandamus where he is acting capriciously or under
a clear error of law.
Conclusion.-A reasonable conclusion appears to be that the inde-
pendent prosecutor system should afford public gains in the vigor of an
enforcement program. But if the system should lead to a genuine impasse
between the two branches of the agency, potential vigorous enforcement
might not be worth its price. It would seem, however, that careful tailor-
ing and good statesmanship may be relied on to avoid the possibility of
stalemate so that functional separation may become both feasible and
desirable. It should be noted that Board Chairman, Mr. Paul Herzog,
himself a vigorous opponent of separation, recently admitted that, some
efficiency has come of this system. 48 In addition, the Congressional
Committee appointed to supervise the functioning has reported that it is
working well.49 Perhaps we shall find that its greatest benefit stems from
the increased public confidence and respect that the Board may earn by its
removal tc; a judicial capacity.
James R. Ryan
Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws
Manipulation of the stock markets was one of the principal motivating
forces behind the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Congressional statement of policy condemned manipulation as having ad-
verse effects upon the fluctuation of the volume of bank credit, upon the
appraisal of security values for purposes of taxation, and upon the valuation
of collateral for bank loans and the operation of the national banking
48. As reported in 11 N.A.M. LAw DIGEST 52 (1949).
49. Ibid.
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system generally.' While these indictments were probably true, the real
impetus of the legislation was apparently the fostering of free and open
security markets, without artificial, fictitious alteration of demand or supply.
Understanding of this fundamental objective requires the comprehen-
sion of the economic functions and justifications of stock markets. During
the infancy of the corporate form of business association, it was assumed
that dissolution of the corporation, as in the case of a partnership, would
secure to the owners the repayment of their investment.2 But one of the
principal advantages of the corporate form, i.e., its durability despite change
in the identity of the associates, led to a state of affairs where dissolution
was only to be expected of unsuccessful ventures. Thus the investor in
capital stock had no means of recovering his investment from the corpora-
tion, and sale of his shares to a third party became the practice by necessity.3
The primary function of stock markets is to supply the necessary element of
liquidity to corporate investment and secondarily to direct the necessary
private capital into industrial investment.4 Liquidity of security holdings
provided by the stock markets enhances their value to the prospective in-
vestor and thus is an indirect aid to corporate expansion. It is obvious that
in the case of debt securities, the investor will ultimately recover his prin-
cipal investment from the corporation, assuming its continuing solvency, but
the added liquidity to his investment provided by the security markets will
still be an important factor in enhancing its value.
Since the principal economic justification of security markets is the
liquidity they supply to corporate security investment, the ideal market is
therefore one where the forces of supply and demand are allowed to operate
unfettered by artificial stimulation or depression.5 The investigation by
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency prior to the enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act exposed the pronounced failure of the organ-
ized security exchanges to perform their true economic function.8 The
existence of manipulative practices on the exchanges was politely ignored
by exchange officials provided there were no technically fictitious trans-
actions such as wash sales or matched orders, and reports of manipulative
activity were dismissed as unfounded rumors.7  That this attitude was
wholly unjustified was established by the evidence gathered by the in-
vestigating committee s.8  Manipulation of security prices not only hampers
1. SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §78b(3) (1946)
(hereinafter cited as EXCHANGE ACT §2(3)).
2. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COL. L. REv. 264, 265
(1931).
3. Ibid.
4. INVESTMENT BANKERS ASSOCIATIoN OF AMERICA, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVEST-
MENT BANKING 353 (1947).
5. STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency pursuant to S. Res. 56, 84, and 97, SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 30 (1934) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.; DICE AND EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 300 (1941).
8. Op. cit. supra note 5.
the true functioning of a security market in supplying a genuine index of
the liquidity of an investment, 9 but the artificial changing of this index
clearly operates as a species of fraud upon all those who change their posi-
tion in reliance upon the manipulated prices or upon the manipulated volume
of trading.10
The scope of this study includes primarily an investigation of those
practices which result in an artificial stimulation of demand or supply for
a security, whether entered into for arrunlawful motive or not, such as wash
sales, matched orders, pool activities, and stabilization, and secondarily, an
inquiry into transactions which do not have a manipulative effect per se but
which are susceptible of abuse in the hands of manipulators, being par-
ticularly adapted to their needs. It is not intended to consider what con-
stitutes fraud in general under the securities laws, nor the obligations of
disclosure of material facts except as the existence of manipulative activity
may be involved. Similarly, no consideration will be given to the problem
of "insider" trading in securities except so far as actual manipulation of
prices by such insiders may have occurred.
COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW OF MANIPULATION PRIOR TO THE
SEcUITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Lawfully recognized injuries occasioned by manipulation are two-
fold: (1) An injury to the state through the tampering with the free and
open market; (2) Injuries to private individuals who change their positions
in reliance upon the manipulated market. The operative facts, however,
which create the respective liabilities are usually the same with the excep-
tion that in actions by private individuals an element of damage must be
shown. With these basic premises in mind a review of the law of manipula-
tion in England and in the United States prior to the national securities
legislation is appropriate.
England.-The first case in the English courts involving manipulation
was Rex v. DeBerenger,n wherein two defendants circulated false rumors
that Napoleon had been killed and that peace would soon be proclaimed.
They were convicted for a conspiracy to raise the price of Government
securities by means of the false representations with intent to injure the
public, the court observing that the state had a right that the national market
should not be tampered with. It was intimated obiter that a combination
to effect a large number of transactions for the sole purpose of raising or
depressing the price level would also be indictable, without the circulariza-
tion of any false rumors. The concept of a free and open public market
was further expanded in Regina v. Aspinall,1 2 wherein a prosecution for
9. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 687 (1935).
10. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321
(2d Cir. 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 650 (1935)
11. 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814).
12. 1 Q.B.D. 730 (1876), aff'd, 2 Q.B.D. 48 (1876).
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obtaining registration of a security on the London Stock Exchange through
false representations was successful, non constat the lack of any intent to
defraud the public. And the dictum of the DeBerenger case was fortified
by the decision in Scott v. Brown,13 wherein recovery on a contract to form
a pool for the creation of fictitious trading in a security, in order to induce
subsequent purchasers to believe that the stock had a bona fide market, was
denied on the ground that the participants to the contract were in pari
delicto. The effect of this case was mitigated however by a subsequent deci-
sion which indicated that where the syndicate was formed for the purpose
of "pegging" the price of a security to facilitate a distribution, and the
pegged price was "fair", the syndicate did not constitute an illegal con-
spiracy.14
Civil recovery by purchasers of securities affected by mafiipulative or
fraudulent acts has been more circumscribed. Though recovery was granted
in the case of a security which had been listed on the London stock exchange
by means of the false representations of the defendant, upon a subsequent
price decline,' 5 the doctrine of reliance in the law of deceit proved an effec-
tive brake to extension of this holding. Thus, where the directors issued
a prospectus containing false representations, but the plaintiff was not one
of the original subscribers to the stock and therefore did not see the prospec-
tus nor in fact rely directly on the false statements, recovery was denied on
the ground that the representations were not addressed to him.', Similarly,
the mere presence of false representations in a prospectus proved insufficient
to grant recovery to a plaintiff who sold short and was then caught in a
corner of the market, because of the absence of reliance.' 7 It was added
in the latter case that there was no private right to a market free from
manipulation.
Thus the English cases, while recognizing the right of the state to a
free and open market, became enmeshed in the traps of reliance and privity
when civil cases were involved.' 8 The concept that fictitious, manipulative
transactions were a species of fraud and were actionable without proof of
reliance or privity of representation was yet to develop.
Common law in the United States.-No reported cases have been dis-
covered recognizing the right of the state to the preservation of free and
open security markets without the aid of a statute. However, recovery on
a contract entered into to raise the price of securities by means of fictitious
transactions has been denied on the ground that the parties were in pari
13. 2 Q.B.D. 724 (1892).
14. Sanderson v. British Westralian Mines and Share Corp., 43 Sol. J. 45
(1898), aff'd sub twin. Sanderson v. British Mercantile Marine & Share Co., re-
printed in U.S. v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
15. Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859).
16. Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
17. Salaman v. Warner, 64 L.T.R.N.S. 598 (Q.B.D. 1891), aff'd, 65 L.T.R.N.S.
132, 7 T.L.R. 484 (Ct. App. 1891).
18. Moore and Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. oF
CMr. L. REv. 46, 65 (1934).
delicto,19 even before the English case of Scott v. Brown 20 was decided.
Similarly, contracts for the dissemination of purportedly unbiased informa-
tion about the merits of securities in which manipulators were interested,
2 1
and for the "stabilization" of the price of a security by the directors of the
issuer,22 were declared illegal for this purpose, though in the latter case a
dissent contended that stabilization was a lawful activity as it operates only
to support the market, as contrasted with the creation of a fictitious market
by manipulation.
The only reported civil case in point was a suit by a purchaser of a
security against a manipulator who created fictitiously high prices by the
operation of wash sales, involving no change of beneficial ownership. 2
Recovery was denied despite proof of the subsequent decline in the value
of the stock, on the ground that wash sales were at most false affirmations
of an opinion as to value. This reasoning is patently incorrect and ignores
the fact that a wash sale is a false representation that a bona fide sale be-
tween arms' length buyer and seller took place at the quoted price.
State Statutes.-The pioneer state in the enactment of penal laws regu-
lating manipulation, as might be expected, was New York, since it was
the security trading center of the country. The making of false and mnis-
leading statements concerning securities, and the reporting of fictitious
transactions therein, were prohibited.2 4 Apparently the more widely used
remedy, however, was the so-called Martin Act,25 which permitted the
fraudulent sale of securities to be enjoined by the Attorney-General of
New York City. Under this statute manipulative activity such as the
creation of a false appearance of active trading by means of wash sales,26
and the circularization of information recommending the purchase of se-
curities in which the publisher was financially interested,27 was prohibited.
Criminal statutes in other states which might be construed as applicable
to manipulative activity are mostly limited to the prohibition of false and
misleading advertising. 28  It can be readily supposed that the quotation
of prices on the exchange which do not represent bona fide sales might
be held to be false advertising, but to the writer's knowledge no reported
case has presented this problem.
19. Livermore v. Bushnell, 5 Hun 285 (N.Y. 1875).
20. See note 13 .supra.
21. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647, 119 N.Y. Supp. 451 (1909).
22. Harper v. Crenshaw, 82 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
685 (1936).
23. McGlynn v. Seymour, 14 Daly 520 (N.Y.C.P. 1888).
24. N.Y. PENAL CoDE §§ 951, 952; People v. Farson, 244 N.Y. 413, 155 N.E. 724
(1927).
25. N.Y. GEN. BusiNEss LAW § 23a.
26. People v. Rice, 221 App. Div. 443, 223 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1927).
27. People v. Brady's Financial Service, 236 N.Y. Supp. 864 (App. Div. 2d
Dept. 1929, mer. opinion).
28. See Moore and Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 46, 65 (1934).
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Federal Mail-Fraud Statute.-The federal statute prohibiting use of
the mails in the furtherance of fraudulent schemes 2 9 formed the jurisdic-
tional basis for the leading case in the United States involving manipulation
of security prices prior to the federal securities legislation. In United
States v. Brown, the defendants were convicted for forming a pool to
manipulate the market in a certain stock, effecting wash sales, and "touting"
the stock being manipulated by means of fraudulent circulars. Over the
objection that the operations of the pool did not constitute a fraud (pre-
sumably on the ground that the fictitious sales were merely false affirma-
tions as to value) the court held that outsiders reading the stock market
quotations are justified in supposing that the quoted prices are appraisals
of value due to a series of actual sales between persons dealing at arms'
length in a free exchange market, and if instead the quotations represent
fictitious sales, a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of this statute is estab-
lished, despite the lack of any proven damage to the purchasers.8 0
The results of the mail-fraud cases 31 are of course limited by actual
holding to criminal punishment under the enabling statute. Nevertheless,
the language used in the opinions was so broad as to justify Professor
Berle's conclusions that the consummation of a sale in the exchange market,
as it is reported, is equivalent to a representation of a bona fide arms'
length transaction, and is a material representation because the price of
such a sale becomes an element in every subsequent offer to buy or sell.
32
Further, he contends that artificial manipulative transactions are essentially
a form of fraud which constitutes a sufficient basis for civil liability to a
defrauded purchaser, or criminal liability by way of an injunction or
permanent punishment under appropriate statutes.m
Though the fundamental bases of liability had been previously formu-
lated by the courts, it remained to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
specify and define manipulative practices and to provide effective means of
investigation and enforcement.34 Regulations under that Act may be con-
veniently divided into two categories: activities unconditionally prohibited,
and activities lawful unless contrary to rules and regulations of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. The former category includes wash sales
and matched orders, creation of a false and misleading appearance of ac-
tivity for the purpose of inducing purchases by others, dissemination of
information designed to induce the purchase or sale of securities, and the
making of false and/or misleading statements. The latter includes stabiliza-
29. 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1946). Under this statute, the Post Office Dept. announced
a policy of not hesitating to issue fraud orders against every person engaged in the
use of the mails for the carrying of "tipster sheets" or "market services." Informa-
tion Service, Post Office Dept., 7/17/33.
30. See note 10 supra.
31. In addition to United States v. Brown, supra note 10, see Harris v. United
States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931).
32. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COL. L. Rtv. 264, 270
(1931).
33. Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 CoL. L. REv. 393, 397 (1938).
34. Id. at 393.
tion, short sales and stop-loss orders, puts, calls, and other options, and
"manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances." In addition the fraud
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 are frequently invoked in the
regulation of manipulative practices.
The organization of the material to follow is in line with the distinc-
tion between activities absolutely prohibited and activities lawful unless
contrary to rules and regulations. The latter category has been further
divided, however. One more or less clearly defined area includes ac-
tivities innocuous per se, but which have been employed as aids to manipula-
tion, e.g., puts, calls, and other options, and short sales and stop-loss orders,
to which has been added the power to define "manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances"; the other area is stabilization, which is in essence
a form of manipulation but which has so many beneficial aspects that it
was not considered justifiable by Congress to prohibit it altogether without
thorough study of the problem by an expert Commission.
ACTIVITIEs ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED
Wash Sales and Matched Orders.-The view that wash sales and
matched orders constituted only false affirmations of an opinion as to
value 5 had been expressly rejected by the time of the passage of the
Securities Exchange Act, and it was recognized that the fictitious nature
of these transactions in creating a deceptive appearance of active trading
was a material misrepresentation3 6 The statute made unlawful the effect-
ing of any wash sale or sale upon matched orders for the purpose of
creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any registered
security.3 7 While it is conceivable that a wash sale might be effected for
other reasons, in the majority of cases the only rational inference is the
prohibited purpose.
As a practical matter wash sales and matched orders seldom occur by
themselves but rather as parts of a larger scheme of manipulation.3 8 Use
of these crude devices in this manner has been discovered by the Commis-
sion as recently as 1946; 89 however the more subtle attempts usually shun
these devices in favor of the placing of sell and purchase orders with a
large number of brokers who have no actual knowledge of the existence of
correlative orders to purchase or sell.40 These activities will be discussed
under the heading "Pool Operations," infra.
35. McGlynn v. Seymour, 14 Daly 520 (N.Y.C.P. 1888).
36. People v. Rice, supra note 26.
37. EXCHANGE AcT § 9(a) 1, House of Representatives Committee on Banking
and Currency, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
38. E.g., United States v. Brown, supra note 10; Matter of Charles C. Wright,
3 S.E.C. 190 (1938), aff'd sub nom. Wright v. S.E.C., 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940);
Matter of Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238 (1935); R.FJ. Koeppe & Co. v. S.E.C.,
95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938).
39 Matter of W.S. Wien & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3855 (9/17/46).
40. House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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Dissemination of False and Misleading Information.-It has been pre-
viously noted that the circularization of purportedly impartial recommenda-
tions of securities by those financially interested therein was deemed to be
a fraudulent sale of securities in New York prior to the Securities Ex-
change Act.41 The use of the mails for this practice gave jurisdictional
grounds to the federal courts under the mail fraud statute to criminally
punish manipulative activity.4 It was established by both Congressional
'and private investigations that a common practice by pool operators was
the employment of publicity agents or publishers of "market services" to
tout the stock in which the pool was conducting manipulation.43 A flagrant
example was the publishing of the "Stock and Bond Reporter" by one
David M. Lion, who netted over $500,000 profit on the options given him
as compensation for publicizing securities in connection with 250 pool
operations during 1928-30. He also employed one McMahon to boost
the manipulated stock. The latter posed as an economist, broadcasting
on the radio as the "McMahon Institute of Financial Research." A further
example was the regular appearance of a column in the New York Daily
News called "The Trader;" the writer being compensated out of pool
profits .
44
Under the Securities Exchange Act this nefarious practice was
effectively prohibited by sections 9(a)3 and 9(a)5, which forbid the dis-
semination of information by any prospective seller or purchaser as to the
likelihood of a rise or fall in the price of any registered security due to the
market operations of others, or the dissemination of such information by
any person receiving a consideration therefor from any prospective seller
or purchaser. Only one reported case had actually resulted in an injunc-
tion or a criminal prosecution under these sections,4 5 but the principal
reason for this paucity of authority is the fact that such activity usually is
part of a general scheme to manipulate prices of a security, which is pro-
hibited by § 9(a)2.
46
The Act also contains a general prohibition against the making of
false and misleading statements as to any registered security, 47 analogous
to § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933,48 which was intended to prohibit the
use of such statements in connection with manipulative operations. This
section requires that the statement be "false or misleading with respect to
41. See notes 21 and 27 supra.
42. See note 31 supra.
43. Senate Committee onv Banking and Curreiwy, SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) ; REPORT, at 36; Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency Pursuant to S. Res. 56, 84, and 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), Cutten, at
5900 (hereinafter cited as "Hearings") ; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY
MARKETs 466 (1935).
44. REPORT at 36 et seq.
45. R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. S.E.C., 95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938).
46. Ibid.; Matter of Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238 (1935) ; S.E.C. v. Torr,
15 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).
47. EXCHANGE ACT § 9 (a) 4.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1946), hereinafter cited as SECURITIEs AcT.
any fuaterial fact." In the past, civil recovery in deceit for misrepresenta-
tions was often hampered by holdings that the statements involved were
of "opinion," or "law," rather than of fact, and therefore the misrepresenta-
tion was not "material," 49 but the modem tendency seems to be to elim-
inate these technical distinctions. 50 It seems a fair assumption that this
tendency would be continued in the interpretation of § 9(a) 4. In the
only reported civil case posited on this section, however, recovery by a
purchaser against a dealer who represented that a certain stock would rise
15 points in the next few days was denied on the ground that the repre-
sentation was a mere statement of opinion as to future happenings; there
was no connection between the statement and the subsequent drop in
price.51 The court observed that the plaintiff "must have either entered
a false market or paid a false price to enter a genuine market" because of
the language of § 9(e), giving a civil right of action to those who purchase
"at a price affected" by acts declared illegal by § 9.
Manipulative Pool Operations.-Manipulation has been defined as a
"planned effort by an individual or a group of individuals to make the
market price of a security behave in some manner in which it would not
behave if left to adjust itself to uncontrolled or uninspired supply and
demand." 52 It is noteworthy that this definition does not necessarily in-
clude any motive or expectancy of profit at the expense of the investing
public and is therefore broad enough to include stabilization (discussed
infra), which is usually conducted without any such purpose. Under this
heading, however, it is proposed to discuss only manipulation entered into
with the express purpose of deceiving others through the fictitious activity
created.
The concept of a pool signifies a joint undertaking by a group of
speculators to alter the price of a security artificially and profit by the
movement in price so engineered. 53 Pools may intend to either raise or
lower the price, being appropriately termed "bull" and "bear," re-
spectively.5 4  As early as 1912 Congressional investigations uncovered
49. E.g., Industrial Trans. Co. v. Russell, 238 S.W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ;
Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Shield, 228 S.W. 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (stock would
be worth 25% more than present price by a certain date, and purchaser would re-
ceive yearly 8% dividend) ; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875) (non-assessability
of stock).
50. E.g., Browne v. San Gabriel River Rock Co., 22 Cal. App. 682, 136 Pac.
542 (1913) ; Loomis v. Pease, 234 Mass. 101, 125 N.E. 177 (1919) ; Haebler v. Craw-
ford, 258 N.Y. 130, 129 N.E. 319 (1932).
51. Rosenberg v. Hano, 39 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd, 121 F.2d 818
(3d Cir. 1941).
52. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SEcuRiTy MARKETS 444 (1935). The dis-
tinction between normal and manipulative conduct depends largely on mental attitude
and purpose rather than any objective distinctions between the two types of conduct.
Andresen, Manipulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 10 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 639, 641 (1942).
53. REPORT at 31.
54. Few examples of "bear raiding" were discovered. Mathias, Manipidative
Practices and the Securities Exchange Act, 3 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 7, 20 (1936).
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some flagrant examples of pool operations, e. g. the pool in the stock of the
Columbus and Hocking Valley Coal Co.55 The pool manager in that case
had 59 different accounts with a single brokerage firm, and orders to buy
were scattered among 25 different brokers who were unaware of the com-
mon source of their employment. A price rise from 27 to 90 was so
effected, and after the pool had liquidated its long position and sold short,
the price dropped to about 30 in one day. The existence of operations of
this kind as discovered in the investigations prior to the passage of the
Securities Exchange Act was one of the principal reasons for the adoption
of that legislation. 56
The operation of a typical bull pool may be summarized as follows.57
The manipulators select a stock to which popular attention has been di-
rected or may easily be directed, for instance, by real or apparent prospects
of a favorable merger, stock split, or favorable earnings statement. It is
then necessary to assure themselves of a sufficient source of supply for the
stock at prices lower than the expected price produced by the artificial
activity. This may be done by selling short at prices on a scale down,
accompanied by unfavorable rumors, which depressed the price, allowing
the pool to cover and start their activity to raise the price. However the
more common practice was to secure an option at a fixed price or grad-
uated prices not far above the market from the issuer or its officers or
directors. The use of an option allows the manipulators to enter the
market at the least cost and risk. So-called "stand-off" agreements may
be negotiated between the pool and the holders of large blocks of stock
to be manipulated obligating the latter not to liquidate during the price
rise to be created by the manipulators and so hamper the operation. If
there are any stop-loss orders slightly below the market (the presence of
which may be ascertained from the books of the specialist in the stock), it
will pay the manipulators to sell short and depress the price to the level
of the stop-loss orders, for execution of the latter will drive the price down
and allow the manipulators to cover and acquire a source of supply at a
very low figure. The next step is the stimulation of demand and the
creation of a fictitious appearance of active trading. Market letters are
sent out to brokers and dealers for the purpose of inducing investors to
buy. Professional publicity agents are hired to tout the stock in news-
paper columns and on radio programs, while posing as unbiased "econo-
mists" or market analysts. Concurrently, active trading among the mem-
bers of the pool is initiated, though care was usually taken not to effect
any technical wash sales or matched orders, which were prohibited by the
rules of the exchange.58 In order to induce speculators to enter the market
55. INVESTIGATION OF FINANCIAL AND MONETARY CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), Popper, at 904.
56. EXCHANGE AcT § 2(3); compare DIcE AND EITEMAN, THE STocK MARKET
300 (1941).
57. REPORT at 36 et seq.; DICE AND EITEMAN, supra n.56, at 310; Note, Market
Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE LJ. 624 (1937).
58. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, op. cit. mtpra note 52 at 471.
and get a "free ride" (their transactions of course have as much market
effect as those of the pool), the pool granted "puts" so that the speculators
would be protected against loss in the event of failure of the operation. In
many instances, brokers were authorized to effect actual wash sales.
Through all of these devices, demand is artificially stimulated. When the
price rises sufficiently, the pool exercises its options. Active buying and
selling is continued with a preponderance of sales. As soon as the long
position of the pool has been liquidated, short sales may be effected, while
active trading is still going on among the pool. After the pool has sold
short as much as the market will bear without breaking, pool support is
withdrawn and a precipitous decline usually ensues, catching all the out-
siders who lacked the knowledge or the foresight to unload before the
break. The pool is then enabled to cover its short position at a low price,
having profited both from the rise it created by purchasing and the in-
evitable decline by short sales.
It is patent that manipulative activities of this nature seriously impair
the efficiency of a security market in performing its function of supplying
liquidity to investment. 59 The frequency of such devices in the pre-1934
era was appalling. It was discovered that during 1929 alone 105 issues
listed on the New York Stock Exchange were subject to one or more pools
or syndicates managed by member firms; and during 1929-33, 175 member
firms participated in pool profits.60 It is more pleasant to report that after
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act the pool dropped out of sight.61
Probably this was due to a large extent to the fact that the exchanges are
required to treat such conduct as grounds for expulsion.62
It would seem to require a fantastic stretch of the imagination to justify
any activity of the sort just described. Yet such statements as the following
have appeared in print:
"The pool is little more than an organization on a scientific basis,
of a 'group of insiders'. It is a group of men who are farsighted
enough to see the potentiality of any stock and the logic of its eventually
selling at the price and in the direction which the pool decides upon.
All that the pool generally does, therefore, is to discount the future
in a scientific way and hasten a market change which, without organ-
ized action, might take ten times as long to accomplish. Economically,
the pool serves a worthy purpose of assisting the open market in
evaluating correctly the true worth of a stock." 63
This apology was substantially reiterated by the then president of the
New York Stock Exchange, testifying before the Senate Investigating
59. Id. at 687.
60. REPORT at 32-33.
61. Hearings before House Comnittee on Interstate Commerce on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Acts, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), Purcell, at 62
(hereinafter cited as "Hearings-Ainendments").
62. E.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CoNsTrruTioN, ART. XIV, § 7.
63. SCHABACKER, STOCK MARKET THEORY AND PRACTIcE 570-571 (1930).
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Committee in 1933.64 The fallacy is no more forcefully indicated than by
the fact that the inspired effect of the pool in assisting the open market to
find the "correct" price for the stock usually terminates abruptly as soon
as the manipulators have reaped their profit, and the subsequent decline
nullifies all of their noble endeavor.
Role of the Specialist.--As intimated supra, the specialist in the
manipulated stock is an invaluable ally of the pool.6 5 A specialist in a
particular stock is an exchange member who is responsible for the execu-
tion of all orders in the stock which cannot be immediately effected at the
then market level. He keeps a record of all these orders in his books and
by making them known to the pool, pertinent information about the sources
and extent of the floating supply of a stock, and the existence of bids below
and offerings above the market, may be obtained.66 In one of the most
profitable pools discovered by the Congressional investigation, the specialist
was a member of the pool manager's firm, which fact speaks for itself,
though at the hearings the specialist denied disclosing his books.6 7 Under
the Securities Exchange Act the disclosure of a specialist's books to pool
operators is forbidden.68  The New York Stock Exchange also prohibits
such disclosure, and in addition the mere existence of an interest on the
part of a specialist in a pool manipulating the stock in which he is the
specialist is prohibited.69
The general lack of exchange supervision over pool operations was
one of the causes of the extensive regulation enacted in the Securities Ex-
change Act.70 The only exchange prohibition that would have been ap-
plicable was the ban on wash sales and matched orders, 71 but as has been
noted, the pool was usually careful to avoid technical violation of these
rules by placing orders with brokers who did not know of the existence of
corresponding orders with other brokers. This type of artificial activity
apparently did not conflict with either the rules or the ethics of the ex-
changes.
72
Manipulation Under the Securities Exchange Act.-Section 9(a)2 of
the Securities Exchange Act outlawed the effecting of a series of transac-
tions in any registered security creating actual or apparent active trading
therein, or raising or depressing the price thereof, for the purpose of in-
64. Hearings, Whitney, at 6616.
65. REPORT at 47; Mathias, supra note 54, at 29.
66. Loss, CASES AND MATERIALS ON S.E.C. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE
81 (1947).
67. Op. cit. supra note 65.
68. EXCHANGE ACT § 11(b) 2.
69. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, RuLES OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, Rules
362, 363.
70. REPORT at 30.
71. SENATE CoMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
72. REPORT at 31.
ducing the purchase or sale of such security by others. The constitution-
ality of this section has been sustained against attacks for vagueness and
for interference with intrastate commerce. 73 The operative facts may be
conveniently grouped as follows: 1) a series of transactions, 2) creation
of actual or apparent active trading therein, or raising or depressing the
price, and 3) intent to induce the purchase by others. It would seem that
the requirements (1) and (2) of the offense are synonymous as a practical
matter for any series of transactions, if effective on an exchange or on the
over-the-counter market, will have the inevitable effect of creating active
trading and/or raising or depressing the price.7 4 And it is possible that
a perfectly legitimate operation will be effected through a series of transac-
tions having the requisite appearance and price consequences, e. g. the mere
accumulation of a large block of stock, or its liquidation. 75 Therefore the
real battleground is the intent with which these transactions were effected,
and this subjective criterion is the distinguishing feature of unlawful
manipulation.7 6 Before examining the nature of manipulative intent, how-
ever, a preliminary problem is often presented as to what constitutes a
transaction for this purpose.
(a) Transactions.-The original draft of the Congressional bills which
ultimately became the Securities Exchange Act contained the language
"series of purchases and sales . . . creating actual or apparent active
trading . . . ",7 and as noted, the bill as enacted into law used the lan-
guage "transactions." 78 This change evidenced Congressional recognition
of the fact that transactions other than actual purchases or sales may have
the same effect. This principle was recognized in Matter of Kidder Pea-
body & Co.,7 9 wherein it was decided by the Commission that the mere
placing of bids in the over-the-counter market was included within the
term "transactions," though apparently there were purchases and sales on
the exchange being simultaneously effected. This holding is almost a
matter of necessity since the probative task of establishing actual sales in
the over-the-counter market would be quite burdensome.
(b) Manipulative Intent.-Where the legal consequences of any act
depend upon the intent with which it was done, a critical probative problem
arises from the fact that direct evidence of intent is usually impossible to
obtain outside of admissions thereof.80 Therefore the well known rule that
73. Wright v. S.E.C., 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
74. Hearings-Anendments, Geer, at 1359.
75. Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 3056
(10/27/41) ; see United States v. Minuse, 114 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
76. Andresen, supra note 52.
77. § 8(a) 3 of S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
78. EXCHANGE Acr § 9(a) 2.
79. Exchange Act Rel. No. 3673 (4/3/45); accord, Matter of W.S. Wien
& Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3855 (9/17/46) ; Matter of Halsey Stuart & Co., Exch.
Act Rel. No. 4310 (9/23/49).
80. Hearings-Amendments, Purcell, at 69.
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intent may be presumed from the acts done operates in the law of manipula-
tion by necessity. Objective circumstances are the chief criteria used by
the courts and the Commission in establishing manipulative intent and
frequently are accorded greater probative value than testimony by the
offenders of a "normal business purpose."
The normal inference from the execution of a series of transactions
such as made up the old pool operation, i. e. unloading securities to the
buying public immediately after accumulation of a large block for purposes
of resale, even though no artificial activity was caused in the process, is
that the operator's intent was to manipulate, and this is the position of the
Commission.8 1 However, the mere process of accumulating a large block
of shares at prices within the normal past market range, without any sub-
sequent sale to the public, was held to be insufficient to establish the
requisite intent; 82 and the Commission has ruled that the lapse of a rea-
sonable time after accumulation of a block of stock for resale, during which
the market price has found its own "independent level," before public dis-
tribution takes place inferentially rebuts manipulative purpose.83 But the
mere presence of independent purchases of the security at a price level to
which the stock had been raised by manipulation does not rebut intent,
because presumably the manipulative transactions raising the price still
have the effect of making purchasers pay more than they would have paid
absent the manipulation. 4
Even without any subsequent public distribution of the security ac-
cumulated by the series of transactions raising its price, there may be
situations where the circumstances surrounding the transaction or the
manner in which the manipulative transactions were effected indicate
manipulative intent. Thus, where the brokers involved were financially
interested in a new issue of securities to be publicly offered at a fixed price,
their series of transactions pending effectiveness of the registration state-
ment raising the price of outstanding securities of the same issuer prompted
the Commission's observation that ". . we find it very difficult to ascribe
to that person any intent other than that prohibited." 85 Similarly, when
the person accumulating a supply of a security "reached" for it, indicating
a preference to pay a higher rather than a lower price, channeled requests
to buy from him into the market so that the price of the transaction would
be reported, and held a series of options at increasing prices, it was held
that the manipulative purpose was established.88 The same result was
reached where the acts of the manipulators included, inter alia, the execu-
81. Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, .nqpra note 75.
82. S.E.C. v. Bennett, 62 F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
83. See note 81 supra.
84 Matter of Federal Corp., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3909 (1/30/47).
85. Ibid.
86. Matter of Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190 (1938), aff'd sub nom. Wright
v. S.E.C., 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
tion of each day's closing transaction at a price above that of the previous
day.
87
In the presence of strong circumstantial evidence of manipulative in-
tent as exemplified by the foregoing acts, direct testimony by the manipu-
lators of alleged motivations such as the bona fide belief that the security
should sell at a higher level,88 or "making a market" for securities by
stockholders to aid in the financing of the issuer 89 is usually disregarded,
and justifiably so. Also, a showing of a specific intent to influence pur-
chases on an exchange is not necessary since the sole requirement is that
the manipulation be conducted in a registered security.90 In addition, at
least for the purposes of injunctive or other relief at the instance of the
Commission, or of criminal sanctions, the presence of damage to any per-
sons who were induced to purchase the security by the manipulated ac-
tivity, is immaterial, though it is a prerequisite to civil recovery. 91
(c) Manipulation in the Over-the-Counter Market.-Section 9(a)2
by its terms applies only to securities registered on a national securities
exchange, as do the remainder of the prohibitions of § 9. Therefore if
transactions which would violate § 9(a)2 are conducted in unregistered
securities in the over-the-counter market, there is no express statutory pro-
hibition involved. However, § 15(c) 1 prohibits the effecting of any transac-
tion, or the inducing of the purchase or sale of any security, by means of
any "manipulative device", the Commission to define such device. It was
held by both ruling and decision that conduct which would violate § 9(a)2
if effected in a registered security violates § 15(c) 1, and also" § 10(b), if
effected in an unregistered security.92 And as has been noted, the mere
placing of bids, without any proof of actual purchases or sales, is sufficient
to constitute a transaction for this purpose.
9 3
Industry Supervision of Manipulation.-The provisions of the Con-
stitution of the New York Stock Exchange which may be used to add
expulsion from membership to the Commission's sanctions against manipu-
lation included the prohibition of "fraudulent acts" committed while a
member,9 4 past fraudulent acts not disclosed in the application for mem-
bership, 95 effecting of fictitious transactions or the execution thereof with
87. R-J. Koeppe & Co. v. S.E.C., 95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938).
88. Ibid.; Opinion of General Counsel, supra note 81.
89. Hearings, 3177 ff.
90. Matter of White, Weld & Co., 3 S.E.C. 466, 541 (1938).
91. Ibid.; Matter of Russell Maguire & Co., 10 S.E.C. 332 (1941).
92. Opinion of the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, Exch. Act
Rel. Nos. 3505 and 3506 (11/16/43) ; Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941) ;
Matter of Masland, Fernon, & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 388 (1941) ; Matter of W.S.
Wien & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3855 (9/17/46); Letter of Director of Trading
and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 2; see Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, 40 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
93. Cases cited supra note 79.
94. CoNsrxroN, Art. XIV, § 1.
95. Id. § 2.
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knowledge of their falsity,96 demoralization of the market by the use of
fictitious transactions, 7 and conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade.98 Any violation of the Securities Exchange Act is
ipso facto conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.99
In addition it is probable that any violation of § 9(a) 2 is sufficient cause
for the revocation of membership of a manipulator in the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers. 1' °
Investigation by the Commission.-Administration of the anti-manipu-
lative sections of the Exchange Act is lodged in the Section of Stabilization
and Manipulation, in turn a part of the Branch of Trading Practices and
Exchange Markets of the Trading and Exchange Division. 110 As of 1949,
this section scrutinizes the price movements of 3500 securities traded
on the exchanges and 5000 of the most active over-the-counter securities,
and also the publishing of earnings statements, declaration of dividends,
publication of financial news items, the granting of options, etc., to ascer-
tain whether any rational explanation exists for price movements.10 2  In
addition, 800 securities were kept under special observation for periods
ranging from 14 to 90 days during 1949 because public offerings of sub-
stantial blocks of the same security or of related securities of the same
issuer were impending.10° This special observation is appropriate be-
cause manipulative activity may be conducted in the outstanding security
for the purpose of "facilitating" the distribution of the new offering. The
object of this program is the implementation of the Commission's policy
of suppressing manipulation at its inception, thus saving the investing
public from losses, rather than prosecuting individuals after the manipula-
tive bud has been allowed to burst into full bloom. 0 4
If no plausible explanation for prima facie abnormal price movements is
discovered from perusal of the other data collected, the Commission insti-
tutes a preliminary informal investigation called a "flying quiz".' 0 5 The
pendency of a flying quiz is kept confidential 101 for two possible reasons:
(1) If no actual manipulation is being conducted, injury to business repu-
tations might result, and (2) News of the Commission's investigation
would have a depressing effect on the price of the security. During the
entire period from the inception of the Commission to July 1, 1949, 2037
96. Id. § 3.
97. Id. § 4.
98. Id. §6.
99. Id. §7.
100. See Matter of Aurelius F. DeFelice, Exch. Act Rel. No. 4272 (7/5/49).
101. MCCo01ICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES Acr AND THE S.E.C. 32
(1948).
102. S.E.C., 15th ANuAL REPoRT 44 (1949).
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. S.E.C., 10th ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1944).
106. Ibid.
flying quizzes were instigated by the Commission.10 7 If facts uncovered
by the flying quiz justify any sanctions, a formal investigation will be un-
dertaken; or if criminal penalties are thought appropriate by the Commis-
sion, the case may be referred to the Department of Justice. 0 8 From 1934
to 1949, only 192 formal investigations resulted from the flying quizzes
instigated.10 9 The Commission also receives a considerable number of
private complaints concerning violations of the anti-manipulative pro-
visions. These are scrutinized with great care because frequently the
complainant has some ulterior motive. It was found that one individual
had just sold 2000 shares of a particular stock short and he desired the
Commission to investigate so that the adverse publicity would depress the
price of the stock, enabling him to cover at a profit.'10
Proposed Amendments to § 9(a)2.-In 1941 bills were introduced in
Congress and hearings held for the purpose of amending the Securities
Acts. The impetus of the legislation seemed to be dissatisfaction with the
allegedly "thin, erratic markets" which existed at the time, the existence
of which was blamed upon the Commission's regulation."' The Wads-
worth bill," 2 which contained all of the proposed amendments to the anti-
manipulative provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, contained an
amended statement of policy whereby the Commission was given the duty
"to encourage and foster orderly, active, stable, and liquid markets for se-
curities upon security exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets.
Y' "Is While this language was innocuous enough, some of the spe-
cific amendments to § 9 were latent with possibilities of abuse by prospective
manipulators."1
4
Section 203 of the Wadsworth bill restated the requisite manipulative
intent as follows: "for the purpose of creating a false or misleading appear-
ance with respect to the market for such security to induce the purchase
or sale of such security," and contained a proviso that § 9(a)2 shall not
be construed as preventing transactions "effected for the purpose of main-
taining a fair and orderly market," inter alia, if such transactions were
(a) reasonably necessary for such purpose, (b) not excessive in
volume, (c) effected within a reasonable price range, and (d) reported
daily to the Commission. . . ." The purpose of these amendments was
107. Op. cit supra notes 102, 105.
108. Op. cit. mspra note 105.
109. Op. cit supra notes 102, 105. Extensive statistics as to the number of
criminal prosecutions or injunctive or other remedial proceedings have never been
compiled due to lack of funds and personnel. Letter of the Director of the Trading
and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 2.
110. Hearings-Amendments, A. Purcell, 82-84.
111. Hearings-Amendments, Explanation of Amendment to § 9(a) 2 of the Ex-
change Act, at 1409.
112. H.R. 4344, 77th Cong. 1st Sess., (1941).
113. Ibid., Amendment to Exchange Act § 2.
114. REPORT OF THE S.E.C. oN PioposALs FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES
ACTs, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1941) (hereinafter cited as REPORT-AMENDmENTS).
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to eliminate the alleged "thin and inactive" markets existing at the time
which were supposed to be a result of the reluctance of persons, especially
underwriters of new issues, to enter the market because of apprehensions
as to the extent of § 9(a) 2 as it was written, carrying with it the dire con-
sequence of impeding the flow of capital into industry. 115 The supposed
indefiniteness of § 9(a) 2 was likened to a reign of terror by the Commission
due to the facility of establishing a prima facie case under that section. 11 6
It was asserted that "market sponsorship" was often required in securities
not known nationally, being registered only on the regional exchanges, for
the protection of investors in those securities," 7 even after distribution,
citing an example of a stock whose market and price collapsed because it
was distributed nationally into areas where it was not known."l8 The exist-
ing version of § 9(a)2 was also criticized because it deterred the ac-
quisition of large blocks of stock, as such transactions do create an appear-
ance of active trading and raise prices, thus "drying up the markets." 119
Clarification of an existing statute by public administrative interpreta-
tion is a commendable objective, for presumably the expert, impartial Com-
mission will interpret a statute in the manner most consistent with its
underlying purpose. As a result of the Congressional hearings it was
found that there was substantial agreement on the part of the Investment
Bankers Association of America, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, and the New York Curb Ex-
change, that attempts to rewrite the statute should be dropped in favor
of the public issuance of interpretative rulings and opinions to clarify any
ambiguities. 20 But there appears small justification, if any, to the claims
that the statute as written was too ambiguous; certainly the effort pro-
duced by Mr. Wadsworth was no improvement with its double-barreled
criterion of intent and the four requirements of transactions for the pur-
pose of "establishing a fair and orderly market," especially "(a) reason-
ably necessary for such purpose, (b) not excessive in volume, . . (and)
(c) effected within a reasonable price range ... "
Substantively, the proposed addition to § 9 was of course designed
to weaken the sanctions against manipulation, characterized by the Com-
mission as "the most important safeguard afforded investors by the Act." 121
The addition to the statement of manipulative intent, i.e., "for the purpose
of creating a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market
for such security . . ." would legalize the classic defense of the manipu-
lators that they were merely "correcting" a price that was too low and
thereby not creating any false appearance.' 22  This is patently undesirable
115. H.R. 4344, § 203(a), Statement of Purpose.
116. Ibid.
117. Hearings-Amendments, Smith, at 1341.
118. Hearings-Amendments, Twombly, at 1456 et seq.
119. Hearings-Amendnents, Geer, at 1359.
120. Hearings-Amendnents, Purcell, at 1491; REPORT-AMENDMENTS, Discussions
of H.R. 4344, at 42.
121. REPORT-AMENDMENTS, Discussion of H.R. 4344, at 50.
122. Ibid.
since the collective judgment of all bona fide buyers and sellers as to the
correct price level is the only determinant of price in a free security mar-
ket. It should not be seriously contended that any interference with the
operation of a free security market is objectionable per se, no matter what
socially desirable objectives might be accomplished,'2 but here the sole
benefit seems to be in the manipulator's profits. Approximately the same
criticism should be leveled at the provision allowing the establishment or
maintenance of a "fair and orderly market", at least insofar as any transac-
tions might be conducted for the purpose of raising the price of the security.
The maintenance of such a market appears to mean "pegging" at a certain
level which is legalized by the existing § 9(a)6, unless prohibited by the
Commission regulation, though profiting from any rise in price produced
by the pegging might violate § 9(a)2.2 4
It seems desirable that no change in the language of the anti-manipula-
tive provisions of the statute be made. The claim that it is ambiguous is
groundless. Since 1941, public administrative interpretations have been
made pursuant to the program concurred in by the representatives of the
securities industry at the 1941 hearings, 2 5 and this of course should be
continued. The damaging of a broker's financial reputation by a groundless
investigation charging manipulative activities is not to be justified lightly,
but under settled interpretations of the statute promulgated by the Com-
mission, such a happening seems highly improbable; and at any rate pre-
liminary investigation is kept confidential. And the concept of free and
open security markets leaves no room for the correction of "thin" mar-
kets, if no one desires to trade, unless there is some extrinsic socially
desirable end which will be prejudiced thereby. Manipulative operations
were frequently excused on the ground that they were "making" or "spon-
soring" a market for the benefit of existing holders of the security.126 The
averment of such a philanthropic purpose suggests the question as to the
source of the manipulator's funds necessary to carry on such an operation.
The answer is shown by experience: he expects to unload stock acquired
at a low price to the investing public at the price level to which his sponsor-
ship carried it, and then he ceases to support the market, letting it drop
to the uninspired levels from whence it came. The basic fact that some-
one has to pay for the "sponsorship" must not be forgotten.
ACTIVITIES LAWFUL UNLESS PROHIBITED BY COMMISSION
REGULATION
Transactions involving puts, calls, and other options, short sales, and
matched orders, and the employment of "manipulative and deceptive de-
123. See the Commission's Statement of Policy Concerning Stabilization, Exch.
Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
124. See section entitled "Stabilization," infra.
125. E.g., Opinion of the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, Exch.
Act Rel. Nos. 3505 and 3506, (11/16/43).
126. See note 89 supra.
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vices", are not prohibited by the Exchange Act but are made subject to
rules and regulations of the Commission prescribed as "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest, or for the protection of investors." Cate-
gorically speaking, "pegging, price fixing, and stabilizing" is includible here
but the different nature of the problems and the relative importance thereof
merit separate treatment.
Options.-Options are of two general types: puts and calls. A put is
a negotiable document giving the holder the right to sell a given security
to the maker at a given price within a given period of time.' 7 A call
gives the holder the right to buy a given security from the maker at a
given price within a given period of time.128 It follows that in order to be
profitable for the holder to exercise a put the price must decline a suffi-
cient amount below the price named in order to cover the consideration
paid for the put, if any; and, conversely, in order to exercise a call
profitably, the price must rise above the call price plus the consideration
paid for the call. The two devices are bearish and bullish, respectively.
The call option was usually an indispensable concomitant of pool
operations because it enabled the manipulators to enter the market with a
large potential supply at a minimum of risk. 29 Such calls were usually
granted either by the issuer or by directors or large stockholders gra-
tuitously, or perhaps for a small fraction of the pool profits.180 During
the period 1929-1933, there were 286 options on stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange of more than 10,000 shares each, indicating the
widespread use of them in pools. 131 In addition the pools used to lure
speculators into entering the market on the long side by granting puts
so as to put a floor under their losses and thereby stimulate activity out-
side of the intra-pool trading. 82 Sometimes the pool itself would obtain
a put so as to insure itself against loss. In the case of a bear pool the
whole procedure would be reversed; a put would be used to provide de-
mand and calls to insure against loss would be used by the pool itself
and to lure speculators into selling short. Exchange rules requiring the
reporting of options granted to members proved insufficient because the
options would be granted to non-members. 3 3
However, some uses of options unquestionably have economic value.1 4
It has never been suggested that there is anything wrong with insuring
oneself against loss. Options perform this function at a very small cost.
127. Hearings, Corcoran, at 6515.
128. Ibid.
129. REPORT at 45, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 463
(1935).
130. REPORT, at 36.
131. REPORT, at 45.
132. REPORT, at 36; Hearings, Cutten, at 5908.
133. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
134. See Hearings, Corcoran, at 6517, Redmond, at 6516, Filer, at 7062 et seq.
A person who wishes to protect his long position may do so by purchas-
ing a put. Should the market decline he may demand that the maker
of the put buy from him. Similarly, one who has sold short may pro-
tect his position by acquiring a call. 35  In the event of a rise he may
cover by demanding that the maker sell to him at the call price. Certainly
if use of these devices were very widespread their stabilizing influence on
the market would be considerable. 3 6 Speculators may also enter the
market by the use of puts and calls at prices far below the margin require-
ments. There are specialized dealers in the industry who originate puts
and calls in sufficient number and at sufficient prices to net them a profit,
and these persons are the source of supply for legitimate options.
37
While it was recognized that there was nothing immoral or illegal
about an option for a large number of shares of stock, the striking adap-
tability of the device to the needs of manipulators prompted the sugges-
tion in 1934 that options should be prohibited since it was difficult to
detect manipulation, at least in its inception.138 However, it was equally
recognized that options had legitimate uses, probably of some economic
value. The original draft of the Exchange Act prohibited options en-
tirely on the premise that it was impossible to distinguish between good
and bad options; therefore a balance of convenience demanded that they
be prohibited entirely. 89 Congress, however, recognized that options
were lawful per se and gave the Commission power to regulate them in
the statute.140 However, registered rights and warrants were exempted
from the definition of the call. 14 ' No regulations have ever been issued
under these sections because there has not been a sufficient frequency of
misuse of options to warrant the Commission in so doing.' 42 It was
suggested that the reporting of the grant of options might be an appro-
priate regulation, 143 but such information is already available through the
reports required of corporate insiders. 44 The Rules of the New York
Stock Exchange forbid dealing in puts and calls on the floor, 145 or effect-
ing any transaction in a stock for an account in which a member is inter-
ested, if the member or his firm has granted or holds any option in that
stock. These provisions were apparently designed to prevent exchange
facilities from being used to further a manipulative pool's activity. 4
6 It
135. REPORT, at 51.
136. Hearings, Filer at 7062 et seq.
137. Ibid.
138. HousE COMMITTEE ON INTERsTATE & FoREIGN COMMERCE H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934).
139. Hearings, Corcoran, at 6515.
140. EXCHANGE AcT § 9(b).
141. EXCHANGE Acr § 9(d).
142. Letter of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 2.
143. Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securities Exchange Act, 3 U. OF
PITT. L. REv. 7, 24 (1936).
144. EXCHANGE Acr § 16 (a).
145. RULES OF TE BoAm OF GOVERNORS, Rule 129.
146. Ibid, Rule 371.
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is submitted that very little gain would result from any regulations under
the statute at the present time, and an appreciable cost might be incurred
in the hampering of the use of options for legitimate purposes.
Short Sales.-A short sale may be defined'as a sale of a security
which the seller either does or does not own, if delivery of the security
is consummated by borrowing it for the account of the seller.147 The
seller's broker usually borrows the security from another broker, deposit-
ing an amount equivalent to the market value of the stock.148  The bor-
rowed stock is in effect returned when the seller effects a covering pur-
chase, and the deposit is returned. Theoretically there is no time limit
for covering purchases except the seller's patience and fortitude. The
raison d'etre of a short sale, of course, is an expected drop in price which
will enable the short seller to cover at a low figure and profit by the
difference between that figure and the price at which he sold short. The
short seller may protect his position by acquiring a call at the short sale
price.1 49 Although a short seller does not actually sell his stock when he
effects a sale, and the transaction is in effect a sale of stock to be delivered
in the future, though at an indeterminate time, a short sale is not a fic-
titious transaction because the short seller represents that he is willing
to sell at the short sale price, although he hopes to buy later at a re-
duced price.' 50
Much ink has been spilled by stock market apologists over the alleged
economic benefits of the short sale. 151 These may be summarized as follows:
(1) short selling "cushions" the declines by forcing compulsory buyers
into the market to cover their sales, (2) It has a retarding effect in a bull
market, and (3) It allows a two-sided market reflecting a consensus of
optimistic and pessimistic views. Any other advantages are of a minor
nature, some of which are applicable only to technical short sales. In
practice the principal alleged advantages have proved to be non-existent
or in some cases diametrically incorrect. The fallacies of the cushion
theory are twofold: first, short selling has an initial depressing effect which
is not likely to be compensated by later covering because the depressing
effect probably induced those who were long to sell, touching off stop-loss
orders; therefore, the selling pressure is far greater than the subsequent
buoyant pressure of short covering; second, short sellers, being rational
people, usually do not cover until the bottom of the decline is in sight, or
until recovery commences, in order to maximize their profit. 52 Accord-
ingly the effect of short selling is to exaggerate, rather than to retard, any
147. EXCHANGE ACT, Rule X-3B-3.
148. REPORT, at 50.
149. Ibid.
150. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COL. L. Rtv. 264, 271
(1931).
151. REPORT, at 53; DICE AND EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 181 (1941);
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECuRrrY MARKETS C. XI (1935).
152. REPORT, at 53.
downward price movement. 53 This conclusion was corroborated by an
intensive study of the recession in the fall of 1937 conducted by the Com-
mission. 54 The theory that short selling has a retarding effect in a bull
market is likewise a figment of the imagination. Short sellers, being bears,
hibernate during the bull markets, and accordingly their activities have
no effect in stemming price rises. 5 5 In fact a large volume of short selling
might ultimately result in the accentuation of a bull movement, at least
in its early stages, because of the covering purchases of those who sold short
during the previous decline. And as for the "two-sided" market theory,
it was shown that prior to 1934 the volume of speculative short selling
was only 57 of the speculative long position.156 Therefore during a
normal market the short sale is not a very important factor. Most of its
real advantages appear in facilitating the functions or arbitrageurs and
odd-lot dealers. 57 The abuse of short selling in connection with manipu-
lation lies in the fact that the short sale was the tool of the bear pools.
Congress was cognizant of the conflicting views and the admitted use-
ful functions of the short sale and appropriately left the matter to Com-
mission regulation.5 8 The study conducted by the Commission during
the 1937 recession prompted it to enact a comprehensive system of regu-
lation of short sales. 159 The backbone of the regulation is a prohibition
of such sales below the, last "regular way" sale price or at such last sale
price unless it was above the next preceding different sale price. 60 Regu-
lar way signifies a sale in exchange parlance in which the security must be
delivered on the third business day following the transaction.' 6 ' Short
sales on a scale down, for the purposes of bear-raiding, or merely to follow
an extraneous price decline with the hope of covering at the bottom, are
effectively prohibited. Sales by odd-lot dealers and arbitrageurs are ex-
cepted from the operation of this prohibition, however. 62 For the pur-
poses of this regulation it is immaterial whether the last regular way
sale price was the result of a long or a short sale. 1 The remainder of
the rule is concerned with proper identification of sell orders, and the
covering of long sales improperly executed as short sales. 16 4 The propriety
133. REPORT, at 53; TWENTETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS C.
XI (1935).
154. S.E.C., TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1944).
155. REPORT, at 54.
156. TWENTFIEH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS C. XI (1935).
157. See DIcE AND ETEmAN, THE STOCK MARKET 181 (1941).
158. EXCHANGE ACT § 10(a).
159. See note 154 mipra. Rules X-10A-1 and X-10A-2 were the result of this
study.
160. Rule X-10A-I (a).
161. Nzw YoRic STocK EXCHANGE, RULES OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, Rules
109 and 112.
162. Rule X-10A-1 (d).
163. Partial Text of a Letter of the Secretary of the N.Y.S.E. to Members,
Relating to Rules X-3B-3, X-10A-1, and X-10A-2, concurred in by the Director of
the Trading and Exchange Division, Exch. Act Rel. No. 1571 (2/5/38).
164. Rules X-10A-1 (b), (c) ; X-10A-2.
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of the regulations of the Commission is fortified by the fact that they have
stood unamended for 10 years. In view of the evidence of the effects of
short selling in a declining market gathered during 1934 and 1937, it is
submitted that the prohibition of short selling on a scale down adopted
is the most effective way to counter the depressing effect of short sales
in a declining market, and does not hamper any of the legitimate func-
tions of short selling.
Stop-loss orders.-Stop-loss orders are directions to a broker to either
sell or buy if the market rises or declines to a certain level.165 Since when
given they are usually several points off the market, their execution is
entrusted to the specialist in the particular stock. Should the market
reach the price named in the order, the latter becomes a market order and
must be executed at the best price obtainable.168 Despite the name, stop-
loss orders are used both for limiting loss and protecting profit.16 7 Stop-
loss orders to sell are used by those who have a long position and wish to
limit loss or protect profit in the event of a decline; stop-loss orders to
buy are used by those who are short and'wish to protect themselves against
a rise. 68
Stop-loss orders have been condemned because they produce "terrific
breaks in stocks." This is so because the specialist is obligated to execute
a stop-loss order at the best price obtainable the moment the stock declines
to the order price, and if there are a number of stop-loss orders being ac-
tivated simultaneously, the market is going to be flooded with sell orders. 16 9
The nexus between stop-loss orders and manipulative activity is that the
existence of a large number of stop-loss orders, which were recorded on the
specialist's books, was an aid, albeit inadvertent, to the operation of both
bull and bear pools.'70 All that the bear pools had to do was to drive the
price down to the level of the stop-loss orders by short selling, and the
remainder of the decline would take care of itself. It was a practice for
bull pools to start bearish in the same manner for the purpose of acquiring
a large supply of the stock to be manipulated at a low price.
IHowever, the aid given to manipulators by stop-loss orders was
patently inadvertent since the originators of the stop-loss orders stood to
lose by the operation of the pool. Accordingly Congress left the regulation
of stop-loss orders to the Commission.171 No regulations have ever been
issued, however, probably because of recognition of the fact that the stop-
loss order is a perfectly legitimate device. There seems to be no present
reason for departing from this policy.
165. Hearings, Wright, at 6097; see Alexas v. Post and Flagg, 129 S.C. 53, 123
S.E. 769 (1924).
166. Hearings, Wright, at 6097-98.
167. Loss, CASES AND MATERIALS ON S.E.C. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE
79 (1947).
168. Ibid.
169. See note 166 supra.
170. See text at notes 65-69 supra.
171. EXCHANGE ACT § 10(a).
"Manipulative and Deceptive Practices."-Sections 10 (b) and 15 (c) 1
of the Exchange Act grant the Commission rule making authority to define
and regulate the use of "manipulative and deceptive practices." These
sections, together with § 17(a) of the Securities Act, which outlaws the
employment of fraudulent devices, obtaining of property by false state-
ments, or engaging in a course of conduct which operates as a fraud on
purchasers, are collectively known as the anti-fraud provisions of the Se-
securities Acts, and manipulative conduct, being a species of fraud, may be
punished under any one or all of these sections, since for this purpose it is
immaterial whether the securities are registered or not, or whether the
transactions are effected on an exchange or over-the-counter.1 72 The terms
"manipulative, deceptive, and other fraudulent device or contrivance" has
been defined as any course of conduct which operates as a fraud upon any
person, including untrue statements of or omissions to state any material
fact, if there are reasonable grounds to believe the untruth or misleading
nature of the statements.' 8  This definition, which accords substantially
with the provisions of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, has been sustained
as against a charge of unconstitutional indefiniteness. 74 Other rules pro-
mulgated under the anti-fraud provisions state that failure to disclose con-
trol of the seller by the issuer is an omission to state a material fact, and
prohibit the effecting of any sales represented to be "at market" by a
broker or dealer unless he knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that
a market exists for the security other than that made or created by him. 75
It has been held that any course of conduct which would violate § 9 (a)
if effected in a registered security constitutes a manipulative device for the
purposes of § 15(c) 1 and Rule X-15C1-2.176 And the requirement of a
"series of transactions" raising or depressing the price of a security as stated
in § 9 (a) is satisfied by the placing of bids in the over-the-counter market,
without any proof of actual purchases or sales.' 77  However, the mere
procuration of agreements from holders of large blocks of the security being
distributed not to enter the market for 60 days was held not to be an objec-
tionable manipulation per se.'78 When the manipulator subsequently dis-
tributes the security to the public, however, representing it to be "at mar-
ket", such conduct is an independent violation of the anti-fraud provisions
because the failure to disclose that the price- in the market is a result of
his own activities rather than the operation of free forces of supply and
172. See ExCHANGE Acr §§ 10(b), 15(c) 1, and Rules X-10B-1, X-10B-3, and
X-15C-1 to 8, inclusive.
173. Rule X-15C1-2.
174. Hughes & Co. v. S.E.C., 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1944).
175. Rules X-15C1-5 and 8, respectively.
176. Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941) ; Matter of Masland, Fernon,
and Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 388 (1941)_; see S.E.C. v. Otis & Co., 18 F. Supp. 100
(N.D. Ohio 1936), aff'd, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939).
177. Cases cited note 79 supra.
178. S.E.C. v. Otis & Co., supra note 176.
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demand is an omission to state a material fact.179 This requirement of dis-
closure has been extended to conduct which is not manipulative per se
but which interferes with either supply or demand, or both, e.g., failure to
disclose agreements on the part of holders of large blocks of the same se-
curity not to enter the market.'8 0 Similarly, failure to disclose past or
proposed manipulation, or other artificial factors affecting the market con-
stitutes a defect in the registration statement under the Securities Act.' 8 '
Efforts in 1941 to amend these sections were aimed at providing more
certainty and preciseness of definition of prohibited conduct by Commission
rule, and prescribing a rule of construction in favor of the accused per-
sons. 8 2 The Commission observed that the only purpose served would
be to aid those of questionable repute to find loopholes, and analogized the
situation to the refusal of the courts to rigidly circumscribe common-law
doctrines of fraud.'8 It is submitted that their position in the matter is
unassailable.
One problem of interpretation exists, however. Rule X-15C1-8 pro-
hibits sales "at market" by any broker or dealer interested in a distribution
of securities over-the-counter unless he knows or has reasonable grounds
to believe that a market exists other than that made or controlled by him.
Apparently disclosure of the control over the market alone will not excuse
the sale. Yet under the stabilization section of the statute and the rules
thereunder the same conduct is permissible if effected in a registered se-
curity on the exchange, providing appropriate disclosure is made, if the
only interference with the market is stabilization to prevent or retard a
decline.'8 4  A possible justification of this inconsistency might be the fact
that the actual prices at which transactions are effected over-the-counter
are not known; only the "bid" and "asked" prices are customarily published.
However, it is submitted that for the sake of consistency the same kind
of market interference should be allowed both on the exchange and over-
the-counter. 5 This result might be reached by construing the language
"a market made or controlled by him" in Rule X-15C1-8 to exclude stabili-
zation activities that would be permissible under Regulation X-9A6-1.
Special Offering Plans.-Rule X-10B-2 provides in general that the
paying of compensation by any person interested in a primary or secondary
179. Matter of Barrett & Co., supra note 176; Matter of Masland, Fernon, and
Anderson, supra note 176; Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111,- 1121
(1940); Matter of Thornton & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 4115 (7/15/48) ; Matter of
S.T. Jackson & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 4459 (6/23/50); Matter of Russell Maguire
& Co., 10 S.E.C. 332 (1941).
180. S.E.C. v. Otis & Co., supra note 176.
181. E.g., Rickard Ramore Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 377 (1937); Canusa
Gold Mines, 2 S.E.C. 548 (1937); Austin Silver Mining Co., 3 S.E.C. 601 (1938);
Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939) ; Potrero Sugar Co., 5 S.E.C. 982 (1939).
182. E.g., additions to SECURiTms Acr § 17(a) and EXCHANGE Acr § 15(c) con-
tained in H.R. 4344, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
183. REPORT-AMENDMENTS.
184. Regulation X-9A6-1.
185. Cf. dissenting statement of Comr. Healy to the Commission's Statement in
re Stabilization, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3118/40).
distribution of securities to another for the purpose of soliciting purchases
of any security of the same issuer, or for purchasing any security of the same
issuer, on any national securities exchange, for any account other than the
payor of the compensation, is a manipulative or deceptive device and is
accordingly prohibited; and any sale of the same security or delivery of it
after sale, if any of the above acts were done, is further prohibited. It is
immaterial for the purposes of this regulation whether the solicitation is to
purchase stock held by the person paying the compensation or by some
other person.186
It was provided in this rule, however, that special offering plans for
securities registered on an exchange'may be submitted by the exchange and
if approved by the S. E. C. are excepted from its requirements.18' The
purpose of a special offering plan is to facilitate rapid distribution of a large
block of stock when the ordinary auction market could not absorb it without
undue price disturbance. 8 8 Both selling and buying commissions, which
may be larger than ordinary, are usually paid by the seller; full disclosure
of the plan must be made to the buyer.1 89 The amended special offering
plans of three exchanges approved in 1949 allow the seller to allot 50%o of
the offering on a firm basis to member firms for distribution; the latter are
allowed to retain the special commission if they are forced to carry the
securities for their own account in the event of inadequate public demand;
and should demand exceed supply those who took on a firm basis are not
required to allocate their supply to the unfilled orders placed with other
firms, as was formerly the case.190 The exchanges are also given greater
discretion in the approval of special offerings pursuant to their plan; price
movements and volume of trading during the last month only are to be
taken into account in making the determination. Delegation of this function
to the exchanges seems to be desirable as long as retention of jurisdiction
over the plan itself is retained by the Commission, since the exchanges are
probably more cognizant of demand and will be better able to predict the
success of a particular offering.
STABILIZATION
Stabilization of security prices is a device commonly used by invest-
ment bankers to facilitate the distribution of securities to the investing
public. Before embarking upon a discussion of the mechanics of stabiliza-
tion or its regulation by the Commission, a brief picture of the development
and the present structure of investment banking is appropriate.
186. Opinion of the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division Relating
to Rules X-15C1-6 and X-10B-2, Exch. Act Rel. No. 1411 (11/15/37). Rules X-
10B-2 and X-15C1-6 are identical.
187. Rule X-10B-2(d).
188. S.E.C., TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1944) ; INVESTMENT BANKERS AssociA-
'ioN OF AMERIcA, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENT BANKING 462 (1947).
189. S.E.C., TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1944).
190. Amended Special Offering Plans of 'New York Stock Exchange,. New
York Curb Exchange, and San Francisco Stock Exchange, Exch. Act Rel. Nos.
4299, 4309, and 4343 (1949).
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Investment Banking Methods.-The function of the investment banker
or underwriter is to gather private capital to supply the needs of industry.
19 '
Ordinary industrial corporations can spare neither the time nor the expense,
nor can they assume the risk, of marketing their own securities to the public.
Should a corporation decide that a certain program of expansion is neces-
sary, it naturally desires to be assured of a certain sum on a certain date at
a minimum cost to it.' 92 In some limited cases a corporation wil be able
to sell an entire issue directly to a large institutional investor, such as a life
insurance company. This procedure is not available for the majority of
securities which do not meet the stringent requirements for. investment in
this type of enterprise. The investment banker, or underwriter, wil then
perform the distribution and assumption-of-risk functions for the issuing
corporation.
Prior to 1916, underwriting procedure in the United States involved
the buying of the entire issue by the originating underwriter from the issuer
at a fixed price and reselling to other underwriters to distribute the risk
(underwriting syndicate), the originating underwriter acting as sales man-
ager for the group.' 93 Distribution commonly took from one to two years
and the spread, i.e., the difference between the price realized by the issuer
and the price to the public, was large. In England the underwriter lived
up to his name. The issuer itself assumes the task of distribution, the
English public being educated to buying securities on the basis of the
prospectus supplied by the issuer. If any part of the issue is not subscribed,
the underwriters are obliged to purchase it at a fixed price. If forced to do
so, they do not usually dispose of the securities immediately, but retain them
until buyers can be found at the issue price or at a small discount.
194 Of
course this method frequently ties up large parts of the underwriter's capital
for a considerable period of time.
The origination of an issue in the United States underwent some basic
changes in the period after the first World War. Increasing demand by
industry for capital for purposes of expansion and increasing demand by
the public for securities apparently caused underwriters to reduce the spread
and to distribute the securities with great haste; they could not afford to
immobilize their capital for very long in any one issue because of the
large number of issues underwritten. 9 5 Present day underwriting pro-
cedure is as follows.' 96  The originating underwriter negotiates the
191. INVESTMENT BANKERS AssOcIATION OF AmERIcA, supra note 188 at 353.
192. Statement of the Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
193. See Matter of N.A.S.D. (S.E.C. 1945).
194. Hearings, Untermyer, at 7737; Dissenting statement, Exch. Act Rel. No.
2446 (3/18/40).
195. Eight leading underwriters in the United States participated yearly in an
aggregate value of securities from 4.11 to 23.83 times as large as their invested
capital. Dissenting statement, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
196. Compare Matter of N.A.S.D. (S.E.C. 1945); RFPORT at 93-95; Hearings-
Amendments, Twombly, 1456 et seq.; Prospectus, 160,000 shares Standard Railway
Equipment Mfg. Co. Common Stock, 10117/50, at 17 et seq.; Exchange Act Rel.
No. 2446 (3/18/40).
terms of the issue with the issuer, e.g., what kind of security is best
adapted to the needs of the corporation, and what kind is best acceptable
on the market. The approximate price to the issuer and the spread are
decided. The originator then forms the underwriting syndicate, taking up
about 10-20% of the issue itself and allotting the remainder to the syndicate
members. The latter sell about 50-60% of the issue for their own account,
and the balance is placed with the selling group by the originator, for pur-
poses of control, to be sold for the account of the underwriting syndicate.
Upon this amount the commissions are split between the selling group
members and the underwriters. Meanwhile the originator has submitted
the registration statement to the Commission, and about one or two days
before the effective date thereof the actual contract is signed by the issuer
and the originator, and the offering price decided, which is usually accepted
by the Commission as an amendment as a matter of course. The originator
is then bound to deliver to the issuer the stipulated amount of capital at
the stipulated time. The terms of the agreement between the underwriters
and the selling group members reserve to the originator the right to re-
distribute any part of the issue that is not selling well, and also the right
to effect stabilizing transactions for the account of the syndicate, sometimes
not over a certain percentage of the entire issue. Members of the under-
writing and selling groups are specifically directed not to trade in, or bid
for, the security being offered for their own account. They are also for-
bidden to trade as agent on unsolicited orders for the account of others.
Mechanics of Stabilization.- 197 Stabilization may be defined as pur-
chasing by the syndicate manager (originator) of the security being dis-
tributed, for the account of the syndicate, for the purpose of maintaining the
price or preventing a decline. Since the securities purchased in the stabiliza-
tion process must be resold if the distribution is to be successful, either of
two procedures will be necessary: (1) the syndicate manager will over-
allot to the members of the underwriting and selling groups to the extent
of 10%; therefore, if the latter sell their entire allotment there will be a
10% short position which will be covered by the stabilizing purchases, or
(2) upon purchase of the security for the purpose of stabilization, the syn-
dicate manager re-allots it to the underwriter or selling group member who
originally sold it, and the latter forfeits his commission. This method was
conceived to combat the practices of some unscrupulous selling group dealers
who undercut the public offering price. The effecting of stabilizing pur-
chases is done by pla6 ing a bid equal to the public offering price on the
exchange and in the over-the-counter market. Of course, if the issue is
unpopular or "sticky", it may be necessary to drop the stabilizing bid
slightly. Stabilizing cannot be used in the face of a general price decline
because the cost would be prohibitive.
If there are outstanding prior to the distribution securities of the same
issuer which are similar in terms to that being offered, it is the practice to
197. Ibid.; see also ATKINS, EDWARDs, AND MOULTON, THE REGULATION OF
THE ScuR MARxES c. VI, III (1946).
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stabilize these securities also in order that the new issue will compare
favorably with that already outstanding.198 Similarly, if securities of the
same class as those being offered are already outstanding in any appreciable
quantity, the originator will secure agreements from the holders not to enter
the market pending the distribution.199
Arguments in Favor of Stabilization.-Underwriters and stock market
apologists have advanced several arguments in justification of stabilization.
Primarily, it is asserted that stabilization is necessary to neutralize a tem-
porary condition of oversupply, resulting from the fact that demand for a
security is dependent to a large degree upon knowledge of its merits and the
record of the issuer.20 0  In support of this argument it is pointed out that
during a reasonable time after distribution most stabilized issues attain a
price substantially equal to or above the offering price.20 1 The second real
argument lies in the necessities of the situation, i.e., the lack of ability of
American underwriters to immobilize large amounts of their capital while
waiting for the public to buy at the offering price.20 2  It is asserted that
prevention of stabilization would seriously burden the flow of capital into
industrial expansion, because underwriters would be forced to accept fewer
commitments and charge higher spreads, assuming that their capital re-
mains constant.20 3 The remainder of the arguments seem to be of a make-
weight nature. It is contended that stabilization gives purchasers who
change their mind a chance to liquidate their investment immediately with-
out loss, and is necessary to combat the activities of short-term speculators
who sell out upon being disappointed at the lack of an immediate profit.2 0 4
Arguments that the underwriters have an obligation to "provide a market",
and that stabilization "aids distribution" by placing the securities in the
hands of ultimate investors instead of speculators, seem to be variations
on the same theme.205 Stabilization during secondary distributions is justi-
fied on the ground that otherwise investors would be unwilling to take up
any substantial block of an issue upon primary distribution because of the
resultant impairment of liquidity.
2 03
Arguments Against Stabilization.-The traditional cry of the reformers
is that stabilization is a form of manipulation and is ipso facto objectionable
198. REPORT at 100.
199. E.g., Matter of Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238 (1935); Reiter-Foster
Oil Corp., 6 S.E.C. 1028, 1048-51 (1940).
200. Hearings-Amendments, Twombly, 1456 et seq.; Exchange Act Rel. No. 2446
(3/18/40).
201. Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40) ; cf. subtitle "Statistics" under this
section, infra.
202. See both majority and dissenting statements in Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446
(3/18/40).
203. Ibid.; see also ATKINs, EDWARDS, AND MOULTON, op cit. smpra note 197.
204. REPORT at 98; Hearings, Whitney, at 6631; ATKINS, EDWARDS, AND MOUL-
TON, op. cit. supra note 197.
205. Hearings, Kahn, at 1119-20, 1124.
206. Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
as an interference with the free forces of supply and demand.20 7  In the
language of the Commission, this statement "poses the problem but does
not answer it." 208  It is further argued that stabilization by definition
creates an artificial appearance of stability of the issue, deceiving investors
who assume that public demand is maintaining the price.20 9  It is pointed
out that buying back the issue at the offering price during distribution con-
fers no benefit upon genuine investors, as contrasted to speculators. 210 The
haste and high-pressure tactics which accompany the entire distribution
precludes educated buying by both the dealer or broker and his customers.211
Stabilization which is continued after the distribution is subject to the addi-
tional criticism that it creates a fictitious credit rating for the issuer.
212
The most serious objection seems to be that upon completion of distribution
and termination of stabilization a sharp decline in price usually ensues,
which is never recovered.213 The Congressional investigating committee
uncovered several bad examples of this phenomenon involving the distribu-
tion of foreign bonds, which apparently influenced their conclusion.
214
Section 9(a) 6.-The conflicting arguments enumerated above and the
lack of conclusiveness of the evidence adduced before the legislative com-
mittees as to the value of or the detriment produced by stabilization
prompted a recommendation that the problem be left to Commission regula-
tion, and so it was in the statute.215 Counsel for the investigating com-
mittee stated that the failure to outlaw stabilization was in deference to the
argument that making a market at the issue price was beneficial, especially
since the Government commonly engaged in the practice with its bonds.
216
The accepted concept of stabilization as interpreted by the Commission is
that "stabilization for the sole purpose of retarding a decline, or preventing
it, whether the stabilization is effected by an underwriter or by an issuer,
dbes not of itself violate §9(a)2 or any other section of the Securities Ex-
change Act . .," whereas activities designed to raise or lower prices are
clearly manipulation and prohibited by § 9(a)2.217 Stabilization is thus a
negative form of manipulation.
207. The most forceful exponent of this view was the late Comr. Healy; see his
dissent to Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446, (3/18/40).
208. Statement of the Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
209. REPORT, at 95, 99.
210. REPORT, at 98.
211. REPORT, at 100.
212. REPORT, at 99
213. REPORT at 97; cf. materials cited note 201 supra.
214. E.g., German 532s floated at 90. by J. P. Morgan & Co., which dropped
from 90 to 86 upon pulling the peg; Chile 6y2s floated at 97 by Kuhr, Loeb & Co.,
which fell to 74.
215. SENATE CoMMIrrn ON BANKING AND CURuNCY, SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d
CONG., 2d Sess. (1934) ; HousE ComilTTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
216. Hearings, Pecora, at 7736.
217. Notice of Proposal to Regulate Stabilization of Security Prices, Exch. Act
Rel. No. 4163 (9/16/48).
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At the time of the passage of the Securities Exchange Act some au-
thorities were of the opinion that stabilization, as a form of price fixing in
interstate commerce, violated §1 of the Sherman Act.218 This problem
has never been squarely decided by court or commission; however in an
advisory opinion rendered in 1945 the Commission concluded that even if
stabilization was considered an interstate restraint of trade, it was probably
a lawful, reasonable restraint, especially since it was usually of short
duration.219
Disclosure in Registration Statement and Prospectus.-Even before
any stabilization rules were promulgated by the Commission, it was of the
opinion that failure to disclose stabilizing activities in the prospectus was
objectionable. 220  Rule 426 of the Securities Act, subsequently issued, pro-
vides that if the underwriters intend to stabilize the price of any security
to facilitate the distribution, the following statement must appear in large
type on the front cover, inside or outside:
"IN CONNECTION WITH THIS OFFERING, THE UNDERWRITER
MAY EFFECT TRANSACTIONS WHICH STABILIZE OR MAINTAIN THE
MARKET PRICE OF (security) AT A LEVEL ABOVE THAT WHICH
MIGHT OTHERWISE PREVAIL IN THE OPEN MARKET. SUCH TRANS-
ACTIONS MAY BE EFFECTED ON (exchange). SucH STABILIZATION,
IF COMMENCED, MAY BE DISCONTINUED AT ANY TIME."
If the offering is of a new issue for which there is no existing market, the
Commission usually requires expansion of this statement in the body of the
prospectus or registration statement to explain that initially at least the
stabilizing transactions of the underwriters have a dominant influence in
the market; that maintenance of prices will not be the sole result of supply
and demand; and that at the expiration of the distribution the market will
cease to have the support, if any, of the underwriters.2 21 Failure to disclose
the existence of stand-off agreements in the registration statement was also
held to be materially misleading for this purpose.
22 2
Stabilization of Distributions "At the Market".-The area in which
manipulative abuses had been most prevalent in the pre-1934 era were mar-
ket offerings, in which the price of the security offered is represented to be
at open market prices established by unfettered forces of supply and de-
mand.22 3 Accordingly this segment of the area of stabilization was the first
218. Moore and Wiseman, Market Manipdation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. op
Ci. L. Rxv. 46 (1934).
219. Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers (S.E.C. 1945).
220. Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 605
(4/17/36).
221. McCo~muc, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRiTIEs Acr AND THE S.E.C. 261
(1948); see, e.g., Prospectus, 160,000 sh. Standard Rwy. Equipment Mfg. Co.
Common Stock, 10/17/50.
222. Reiter-Foster Oil Corp., 6 S.E.C. 1028, 1048-51 (1940).
223. Hearings-Amendments, Purcell, at 83-85; Letter of Director of Trading
and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 1.
to be regulated by the Commission, in pursuance of its policy of piecemeal,
experimental regulation.22 4  Before the effectiveness of Rule X-9A6-1,
stabilization might have been affected in a distribution at market at prices
above the initial offering price providing there were independent purchases
raising the market price to that level.2 2 5  The new rule 226 precluded
stabilization purchases at any price above the last legitimate sale price on
the designated exchange, or at that price unless the day's high so far was
Y2 of 1% or Y point higher. The maximum price at which any stabilizing
purchase might be effected, irrespective of the above rule, was established at
1 point higher or 102Y2 % of the initial legitimate sale price, whichever is
lower. Disclosure requirements include the transmission of a notice of In-
tention to stabilize to the Commission, the inclusion of a statement to every
purchaser before the completion of the transaction to the effect that stabiliza-
tion may have been undertaken or may be undertaken to facilitate the offer-
ing in any written communication designed to induce purchases by others,
and, if a sale is made over-the-counter, additional written disclosure to the
effect that stabilizing transactions have been effected, if such be the fact.
Stabilizing transactions designed to raise the price, if effected at a price
which has been attained through previous manipulation, are strictly forbid-
den. These rules apply only to registered securities, but both the securities
being offered and those which may be stabilized to facilitate the offering,
e.g., other securities of the same issuer, are included.
Rule X-17A-2 requires the filing of reports by stabilizers on every
business day of all transactions in the securities being stabilized to the Com-
mission, and also a notice of termination of stabilization, and is applicable
to both fixed-price and market offerings. In addition, all persons who must
file a registration statement under the Securities Act are obliged to file
these reports.
Distributions over-the-counter which are represented to be at market,
however, are not subject to these rules. Rule X-15C1-8 forbids sales dur-
ing a distribution over-the-counter which are represented to be at market,
unless the person effecting the sales knows or has reasonable grounds to
believe that a market exists other than that made or controlled by the
stabilizers. While this language does not demand the conclusion, the
authorities concur that stabilization in connection with this type of dis-
tribution is in effect prohibited.
22 7
Distributions at the market have never been very popular and are very
infrequent today; virtually all offerings of substantial size are now of the
fixed-price type.228 According to the Director of the Trading and Exchange
224. Statement of the Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
225. Ibid.
226. Regulation X-9A6-1.
227. Andresen, Manipulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 10
GEo. WAsr. L. REv. 639, 647 (1942); Parlin and Everett, The Stabilization of
Security Prices, 49 CoL L. Rnv. 607, 609 n.15 (1949).
228. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 608.
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Division of the Commission, although Regulation X-9A6-1 was used to
some extent by underwriters offering listed securities at market when it was
first promulgated, stabilization programs thereunder have been virtually
non-existent since 1943.229
Stabilization of Fixed-Price Distributions.-Problems of the stabiliza-
tion of fixed-price offerings are probably the most practically significant
involving the anti-manipulative sections of the securities laws, since virtually
all distributions, both primary and secondary, are now of this type,230 and
a large proportion of the registration statements filed contain notice of an
intention to stabilize.231  The only positive statutory and/or regulatory
guides for the stabilizer of this type of offering are in Rule 426 under the
Securities Act, requiring disclosure in the prospectus of proposed stabiliza-
tion, and Rule X-17-A2 of the Securities Exchange Act, requiring periodic
reports of stabilizing transactions and notice of the termination of stabiliz-
ing. All other statutory and regulatory guides are negative; they include
§ 9 (a) 2, the anti-manipulative section, and the anti-fraud provisions of both
Acts and the rules promulgated thereunder.232  The policy of the Com-
mission, in which the securities industry has concurred, has been and con-
tinues to be to leave the matter to administrative interpretation since the
anti-manipulative section and the disclosure doctrines under the anti-fraud
provisions provide effective limits beyond which stabilizing activity may not
transcend.233 This flexibility of regulation is particularly desirable in this
field.
2 34
The Commission's present interpretation of the scope of permissible
stabilizing transactions in fixed-price offerings is that ". . . stabilization
for the sole purpose of preventing or retarding a decline . . . does not
violate § 9(a) 2 or any other section of the . . . Act . . . so long as
stabilizing transactions are effected at (or below) the public offering price
. . . and that within these restrictions there is no limit under existing
statutes and rules as to the amount of securities which may be purchased in
the stabilizing process." 235 Therefore, transactions raising the price of the
security being offered or creating excessive trading therein clearly are not
protected and fall within the ban of the anti-manipulative section.23 6 And
since the mere act of distributing securities accumulated through a series of
transactions raising the price thereof constitutes a strong inference of
229. Letter of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 1.
230. See note 228 supra.
231. S.E.C. l1th ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1945); 15th ANNUAL REPoRT 45 (1949).
232. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 609.
233. Letter, spra note 229, p. 1.
234. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 612.
235. Notice of Proposal to Regulate Stabilization of Security Prices, Exch. Act
Rel. No. 4163 (9/16/48).
236. Opinion of the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, Exch. Act
Rel. Nos. 3505 and 3506 (11/16/43).
manipulation,23 6a a fortiori stabilization at that level is also objectionable.
23T
Purchases above the offering price pending distribution clearly constitute
a series of transactions raising the price sufficient to satisfy § 9(a)2, and
transactions of this nature are not excused under the label "trading" if any
member of the underwriting group is still engaged in distribution, regard-
less of the position of the person who effects the purchases.2
8
It will be recalled that modern underwriting practice in the United
States frequently involves a syndicate over-allotments of about 10% for the
purposes of creating buying power to conduct the stabilization.P 9 Should
the stabilizing purchases be fewer than the short sales, as might very well
be the case if the issue is a success, the syndicate manager will have to enter
the market and cover the short sales at a higher price than the offering
price. However, this must not be done pending the distribution, because
the effect of the transaction will be to raise the price for the purposes of
inducing purchases by others in contravention of § 9(a)2. The net position
of the whole syndicate must be short and stand-off agreements must have
been terminated to be outside the category of manipulation.240  Difficulties
of this nature are obviated by the alternative of re-allotting securities pur-
chased through the stabilization program to the dealers who sold them
initially, for purposes of resale.
241
Theoretically anyone may stabilize to facilitate a distribution. In prac-
tice usually this activity is restricted to the originating underwriters.
Where competitive bidding is required by statute, issuers will occasionally
stabilize their outstanding securities prior to the proposed distribution, pos-
sibly with a view to securing higher bids.24 A complaint alleging that an
issuer stabilized the price of its outstanding stock at 132 in anticipation of
an additional offering at 13 was held to state a cause of action for misuse of
corporate funds, because of the great volume of purchasing necessary to
maintain the price at 13Y/2, on the theory that the funds were expended in
doing an illegal act, i.e., violating the anti-manipulative provisions of the
Exchange Act.23 The Commission as arnicus curiae in that case pointed
out that bona fide stabilization was legal, but the result is probably posited
on a suspicion that the great volume of "stabilizing"' purchases needed to
peg the price at 13Y2 indicates that the alleged stabilization really might
have raised the price to 133/2.
Stabilization may be commenced at the fixed public offering price if
there is no existing market, this level being the limit at all times, since the
236a. Opinion of General Counsel, Exch. Act Rel. No. 3056 (10/27/41).
237. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 619; Matter of Michael J. Meehan,
I S.E.C. 238 (1935); Matter of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3673
(4/3/45).
238. Opinion, op. cit. supra note 236; Matter of Halsey, Stuart & Co., Exch.
Act Rel. No. 4310 (9/23/49).
239. See text following note 196 upra.
240. Opinion, op. cit. supra note 236; Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 624.
241. See note 239.
242. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 615.
243. Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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theory of stabilization is to prevent or retard declines.
2
4 If there is an
existing market it may not be commenced above the first sale price, in the
case of a listed security, or above the highest independent bid price, 
if the
security be unlisted.
245 Otherwise the effect of the stabilizing transactions
would be to raise the price for the purpose of inducing others to purchase
in violation of § 9(a)2.
Raising the stabilizing bid may only be done under the following very
limited circumstances.
246  Suppose a fixed offering price at 100, and
stabilization is commenced at 100. The volume of purchases needed to prop
the market at 100 makes the cost of so doing excessive and the syndicate
manager drops the stabilizing bid to 98. The market then independently
rises to 99. The stabilizing bid may be raised to 99. Suppose the market
independently rises to 101. The stabilizing bid may be raised to 100, 
but
no further. The principles behind these examples are that stabilizing bids
may be raised only when the market rises independently, i.e., from the
influence of the stabilizing purchases at the lower figure, and reaches the
higher level, and in no case may the stabilizing bid be raised above the
public offering price. The probable difficulties of proving an independent
rise of the market to a level higher than the existing stabilizing bid relegate
this problem to academic importance only, it is submitted.
Statistics as to the Amount and Effect of Stabilization.-Proper weigh-
ing of the economic effects of stabilization requires the consideration of some
important statistics. It was found that during 1945-47 approximately 90%
of underwriting contracts were on a firm commitment basis calling for fixed
public offering prices; the remainder were the so-called "agency" or "best
efforts" contracts in which the underwriters are 
mere selling agents
2 47
In 1948-49 the value of all securities floated by firm commitment contracts
was $2,758,454,000, as contrasted with only $557,361,000 distributed on a
best-efforts basis.
248
The 1948-49 figures show that of the total value of securities dis-
tributed, approximately 65% were debt securities, equally divided between
debentures and secured bonds; only 9% were preferred stocks, and the re-
maining 26% constituted common stocks.
2 49
During 1944-45, of the 402 registration statements filed with the Com-
mission, 276, covering 325 offerings, contained a statement of intention to
stabilize.2 50  However, stabilizing operations were actually conducted to
facilitate only 64, or about 20%, of these offerings.
2 51 During 1948-49, of
the 455 registration statements filed, 188, covering 209 offerings, contained
notice of an intention to stabilize; but only 66, or 32% of these offerings
244. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 617.
245. Ibid.
246. Parlin and Everett, supra note 227 at 621.
247. S.E.C. CosT OF FLOTATION OF RGIsTE SEcuRrnms 3 (1949).
248. S.E.C., 15th ANNUAL REPORT, table 1, pt. 2, p. 201 (1949).
249. Ibid.
250. S.E.C., 11th ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1945).
251. Ibid.
were actually stabilized.252 Only 2 of the 66 offerings stabilized were bond
issues.
The most damaging practical criticism of stabilization has been that
upon the termination of distribution the price drops and consequently the
practice allows underwriters to distribute overpriced issues at a profit to
themselves. Against this criticism it may be pointed out that the under-
writer's spread will be approximately the same even if the price were lower,
and therefore the issuer is getting the real bonanza, be there any. The other
premise is that issues that have to be stabilized are overpriced. To reach
this conclusion it has to be shown that after distribution is completed a more
or less permanent drop in price occurs.
In the case of 203 bond issues floated during 1921-31, after eliminating
market fluctuations, the Commission found an average drop of 2 point at
the termination of distribution; during the second year after issue, the
average price was 1Y2 points below the issue price.253  A similar study
independently taken, of 288 bond issues originated from 1924-32 that were
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, showed that 79.3% of the issues,
representing 77.5%b of the aggregate offering price, "broke" their offering
prices within 6 months. 25 4 The amount of depreciation is revealing:
DEPRECIATION AT END OF 6 MONTHS








On the other hand, a similar study by the Commission of 19 new bond
issues distributed from March 15 to August 31, 1939 showed that 12 of the
19 issues dropped an average of 1.4 points below the offering prices by the
third month following commencement of the offering; but on January 1,
1940, the open market price of every issue was above the offering price,
after adjustment for market trends. 2 55 And another independent study of
354 bond issues floated from 1927-40 reached the following pertinent con-
clusions: 256
252. S.E.C., 15th ANNUAL REPoRT 45 (1949).
253. Statement of the Commission, Exch. Act Rel. No. 2446 (3/18/40).
254. Steiner and Lasdon, The Market Action of New Issues-A Test of Syndi-
cate Price Pegging, 12 HARV. Bus. REv. 339 (1934).
255. Statement of the Commission, supra note 253.
256. Lasdon, The Market Action of New Issues, 151 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL
CHRONICLE 1774 (1940).
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1. 85% of the issues (value basis) could have been liquidated at a
profit within 1 year after purchase.
2. The poorest market action was experienced with those issues for
which no accurate pricing guides were available.
3. 29 of the 54 issues which broke their offering price and failed to re-
cover within 1 year were patently overpriced, e.g., they fell in a
rising bond market, or were priced to yield less than comparable
securities.
4. Of the 85% that could have been liquidated at a profit within 1 year,
26.6% did not break their offering price within 6 months.
The Commission unfortunately has never had the personnel nor the
funds to compile complete statistics as to the effect of stabilization.2 57 The
above figures are patently inadequate for they reveal nothing about the
behavior of stocks stabilized during distribution; most recent stabilization
appears to have been undertaken in stock issues. However, it is submitted
that the following conclusions may be drawn:
1. As the great preponderance of modem underwriting contracts are
of the fixed-price, firm commitment type, the underwriters' argu-
ments concerning the flow of capital into industry must be given
weight.
2. The preponderance of recent financing appears to be in debt se-
curities, and the most recent statistics as to these indicate that
serious overpricing is not prevalent.
3. However, actual stabilization appears to be concentrated in the dis-
tribution of equity securities, as to which no statistics as to market
behavior after the completion of distribution are available.
Proposals for Amendinent.-As part of the general program of amend-
ment of the securities laws initiated in 1941, considerable attention was
directed at amending and clarifying § 9(a) 6. Some of the testimony indi-
cated a desire to allow -departures from the basic principle of stabilization,
i.e., that the only permissible transactions are those preventing or retarding
a decline in price; e.g., purchasing above the original issue price "for the
purpose of meeting dealer demand," while other activities whose legality
was argued were subsequently established to be lawful by the Commission's
interpretative releases.258  One of the provisions of the Wadsworth bill
provided that no rule or regulation of the Commission promulgated under
§ 9(a)6 should prohibit transactions effected for the purpose of "establish-
ing a fair and orderly market" providing such transactions were; (a)
reasonably necessary for such purpose; (b) not excessive in volume; (c)
effected within a reasonable price range; and (d) reported daily to the
257. Letter of Director of Trading and Exchange Div., 11/21/50, p. 2.
258. Hearings-Amendments, Twombly, at 1456 et seq.
Commission." 259 The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the Com-
mission from nullifying the proposed amendments to § 9(a)2 by its rule-
making power under § 9(a)6.260 That this proposed amendment had the
undesirable effect of opening up a loophole for transactions raising or
depressing the price of securities to induce action by others was recognized
by the Commission, and the bill never became law.261 In general the
securities industry agreed with the Commission that amendment of § 9
was not feasible, and requested only further publicity of administrative
interpretations, which has been done.
2612
In 1948 the Commission announced that it was proposing to extend
regulation of stabilization and invited comment from the industry regarding
the proposed extensions.263 Questions in which the Commission was "par-
ticularly interested" included:
1. Prohibition of stabilization altogether, or of specific types, e.g., by
issuers, in advance of offerings, of classes of securities other than
that being offered, and overallotments by the syndicate manager.
2. Limitations on the nature and extent of stabilization, e.g., amount
of stabilizing purchases; formulae for the dropping of bids, pro-
hibition of increases in the stabilizing bid; and prohibition of trad-
ing in the offered securities by persons interested in the offering.
3. Condtioning the right to stabilize upon obligations to "sponsor"
the market after distribution, or to prevent any rise in price during
distribution.
4. Added disclosure requirements, e.g., the ticker tape.
5. Freer interchange of information among the underwriting and sell-
ing syndicates.
6. Prohibition of profiting from price disparities by either purchasers
or distributors.
Responses to this request were predominantly in favor of preserving the
status quo. The present attitude of the Commission is that its methods
of enforcement and investigation have been adequate for the purposes of
protecting the public interest without unduly hampering the industry. It
is pointed out that the language of § 9(a)2 provides effective limits upon
the scope of permissible stabilizing activities, and that for that reason and
for reasons of flexibility there has been no necessity for a comprehensive
stabilizing rule.
2 64
259. H.R. 4344, § 203(b).
260. Ibid., Statement of Purpose.
261. REPoRT-AuENDmENTs.
262. Ibid.
263. Notice of Proposal to Regulate Stabilization of Market Prices, Exch. Act
Rel. No. 4163 (9/16/48).
264. Letter of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, 11/21/50, p. 1.
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It seems very difficult to make an effective argument against the posi-
tion taken by the Commission, especially in view of the phenomenal con-
currence of the industry. It is submitted, however, that because of the
intensively practical nature of the problem of stabilization, a comprehensive
study of the post-distribution behavior of both stocks and bonds that have
been stabilized during distribution should be undertaken. This is most
important since the most effective argument against stabilization is that it
results in price declines after distribution of a more or less enduring nature;
the argument that stabilization, being a form of manipulation, is ipso facto
objectionable, in the language of the Commission, "merely poses the prob-
lem but does not answer it." 265 Since there seems no imminent likelihood
of American underwriters expanding their capital so that they can become
true underwriters, retaining the unsold securities until buyers are found
at or near the offering price, as do their British counterparts, the problem
of stabilization will be present for a considerable time, as long as the Com-
mission continues to recognize that it has a duty to facilitate the flow of
capital into industry, correlative with its duty of protecting investors. In
fact these obligations may not only be reconcilable, but also may be co-
incident to a certain degree.
28 6
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Congress and the Commission have been
eminently successful in curbing the vicious manipulative practices that
prevailed before the enactment of the securities laws, while concurrently
keeping sight of the highly practical nature of the problems of "permissible
manipulation," e.g., stabilization and special offering plans. The Commis-
sion has not allowed itself to be blinded by the free and open concept of a
securities market, and has not interfered excessively with devices which
cause some slight alterations in that concept. Complaints about "red tape"
in this area of securities regulation have been at a minimum.
Future progress in this area should be continuance of the policy of
publicly announced administrative interpretation. Manipulation is basically
a form of common-law fraud, an offense which neither the courts nor the
legislatures have ever found desirable to describe in rigid language.267
Stabilization, being a practical problem, should not be rigidly regulated
because changes in business conditions may invalidate the reason of the
regulation. The nature of these problems point irresistibly in the direction
of flexible administrative interpretation by an expert commission, which
follows the commendable practice of consulting the industry before making
extensive changes, and of announcing publicly such interpretations. In
one case the procedure was even reversed, the Commission approving an
interpretation of its own rules made by an official of the New York Stock
Exchange.




The only real criticism of Commission administration in this area is
the lack of actual knowledge of the price effects of stabilization, for which
the Commission's budget is apparently to blame. Because of the concur-
rence of the industry and the Commission in its present stabilization policy
it seems likely that nothing will be done along this line due to lack of
interest, barring another 1929, which prospect seems quite remote.
Christopher Branda, Jr.
